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ABSTRACT 
Infants' Concept of Intention: Investigating Inter-task Relations and Developmental 
Continuities 
Kara M. Olineck, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2008 
The objective of the present thesis was to examine infants' understanding of other 
people's intentions. The first paper was designed to systematically investigate whether 
the tasks currently being used to tap into infants' understanding of intentional action are 
actually measuring the same underlying abilities. Infants completed two visual attention 
tasks when they were 10 months of age: a goal-detection task and an action-parsing task. 
Approximately four months later, infants were invited back to the laboratory to complete 
two imitation tasks: a behavioral re-enactment task and a selective action imitation task. 
Infants' concurrent performances on the visual attention tasks were linked; however, no 
association between their performances on the imitation tasks was observed. 
Interestingly, infants' performances on the visual attention tasks at 10 months predicted 
their performance on the behavioural re-enactment task, but not their performance on the 
selective action imitation task, at 14 months. 
In the second paper, the issue of developmental continuities was explored. The 
goal of this paper was to investigate whether infants' performance on the selective 
imitation of intentional actions task would predict their use of internal state language 
and/or their theory of mind abilities later on. Towards this purpose, 14- and 18-month-
olds completed an imitation task that required them to distinguish intentional from 
accidental actions. At approximately 32 months, children's use of internal state terms was 
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assessed via parental report. Finally, when children were 4 years of age, they were re-
tested with an interactive game measuring intention understanding, a battery of general 
theory of mind tasks, and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. Importantly, infants' 
performance on the selective action imitation task was linked to their performance on the 
preschool intention task. Moreover, children's use of internal state language at 32 months 
predicted their theory of mind skills at 4 years of age. Taken together, the results of the 
present thesis support the hypothesis that there is developmental continuity in children's 
understanding of intention from infancy through the preschool years. Results from these 
two papers also provide evidence to support the validity of various experimental 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
Adults make inferences about other people's behavior every day, a process that 
entails a form of naive psychology. Naive psychology (also known as "theory of mind" 
and/or folk psychology) involves having some understanding that people have internal, 
subjective mental states (i.e., desires, intentions, and beliefs) that can explain and predict 
behavior. For instance, if we see someone walking slowly down the aisle of a department 
store, with their head bent low and their eyes scanning the floor, we may attribute this 
person the following mental states: (1) this person wants to find something she has lost 
(desire), (2) this person intends to find the missing object by searching the floor of the 
department store (intention), and (3) this person believes that the object she has lost may 
be located on the floor (belief). Remarkably, adults are able to attribute mental states to 
other people with little conscious effort. These mental reasoning skills help foster other 
advanced human abilities such as displaying empathy (Barr, 2006) and interpreting jokes 
or sarcasm (Leekam, 1991). 
For the past two decades, cognitive developmental scientists have been 
investigating when and how children develop a similar understanding of the mind. Most 
researchers agree that a critical milestone in theory of mind development is gaining the 
ability to attribute false beliefs. In order to truly understand the concept of false belief, 
one must realize the following: (1) how beliefs are formed, (2) that people's mental 
representations of the world can be different from one's own and do not necessarily 
reflect reality, and (3) that people's behavior can be predicted and/or explained by their 
mental states (i.e., beliefs). Wimmer and Perner (1983) were the first researchers to 
design a task that taps into children's understanding of false belief. Since then, numerous 
1 
versions of this standard false belief task have been created. In a typical false belief task, 
the experimenter tells the child a story using pictures and toy figurines. For example, in 
the "Sally-Ann Transfer Task" (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), the child is told a 
story about two characters (i.e., Sally and Ann) playing with a toy. Sally and Ann put the 
toy in a box, and then Sally leaves. Ann stays in the room and removes the toy from the 
box in order to play with it again. When she is finished, she puts it away in a different 
box. Sally returns, and the child is asked where she will search for the toy. To pass the 
task, the child must recognize Sally's false belief about the situation and look in the box 
where she initially put the toy. The child fails the task if he/she indicates that Sally will 
look in the second box, where the child knows the toy is hidden. Children who pass the 
false belief task understand that another person's belief about a situation can differ from 
their own, and they are able to predict that person's behavior based on this knowledge. 
Several studies have shown that, by the time children reach 4 or 5 years of age, they are 
able to reliably pass the false-belief task (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). As such, 
children this age are thought to have a representational understanding of the mind. 
Although this level of understanding does not emerge until 4 or 5 years of age, a 
substantial number of studies have indicated that even 2- and 3-year-olds have some form 
of folk psychology (e.g., Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). For example, 2-year-olds can 
predict other people's actions based on their expressed desire (Wellman & Woolley, 
1990) and they understand the link between other people's desires, perceptions, and 
emotions (Wellman, Phillips, & Rodriguez, 2000). Furthermore, 3-year-olds recognize 
that people act intentionally in order to achieve an outcome, and they can distinguish 
intentional actions from other non-purposeful actions such as accidents or movements 
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due to reflexes or gravity (Call & Tomasello, 1998; Schult & Wellman, 1997; Shultz, 
1990). Some researchers have suggested that younger children may also have some 
implicit understanding of false belief, but fail the canonical test of theory of mind (i.e., 
false belief task) because of the excessive language and computational demands inherent 
in the task (Bloom & German, 2000; Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Fodor, 1992; 
Premack & Premack, 1995). Children under 4 years may also fail the classic false belief 
tasks because of poor inhibitory control (e.g., Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998) and the so-
called reality-bias (i.e., young children's own knowledge about a situation has been found 
to interfere with their ability to answer correctly)(Birch & Bloom, 2003; Leslie, German, 
& Polizzi, 2005; Mitchell & Lacohee, 1991). Indeed, investigators have shown that 2-
and 3-year-olds are able to pass modified versions of the false-belief task when they are 
simply required to look, rather than say, where the character will search for her toy 
(Clements & Perner, 1994; Garnham & Ruffman, 2001). For example, in a recent study, 
Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007) presented 25-month-olds with movies in which an 
actor watched a toy being hidden. When the actor was looking away, the location of the 
toy was switched. In order to examine children's ability to attribute false-belief, the 
investigators used an eye-tracker to encode 25-month-old infants' anticipatory looking 
behavior. Interestingly, when the actor re-oriented infants towards the scene, they reliably 
looked towards the location that she would search for the toy if she had a false-belief. 
These results provide evidence to suggest that children as young as 25 months may 
possess the ability to attribute false beliefs. 
Such findings have prompted researchers to take a closer look at how children 
first begin to construe others as psychological beings. As such, cognitive developmental 
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scientists' have begun to examine putative precursors to theory of mind development in 
infancy. One of the earliest, and most important, building blocks for theory of mind may 
be infants' special interest in other people. From the moment they are born, infants 
differentially attend to human faces, voices, and movement (Flavell, 2004). They also 
seem motivated to interact with other people. For instance, when they are 6 to 8 weeks 
old, infants smile in response to an adult's behavior (Hains & Muir, 1996). Intuitively, it 
makes sense that theory of mind development begins with infants' inherently strong 
desire to learn about people. 
Another precursor to theory of mind that has been identified among newborns is 
their ability to attend to, and imitate, other people's behavior. Research has shown that 
newborn infants can imitate another person's tongue protrusions reliably (Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1977). According to Meltzoff (1999), early imitation is pertinent to theory of 
mind because it requires infants to make a connection between their own internal states 
and the observable world of other people. Thus, infants' early abilities to imitate other 
people's actions may represent an important step towards developing a full-fledged 
theory of mind. 
Other potential building blocks for theory of mind include infants' abilities to 
follow gaze and detect the goals underlying people's behavior. By the end of the first 
year, infants are sensitive to goal-directed action and they can identify the goals of other 
people using cues such as eye gaze and emotion (Baird & Baldwin, 2001; Gergely, 
Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995; Phillips, Wellman, & Spelke, 2002; Woodward, 1998). 
These abilities are said to represent infants' understanding of intention in action. 
Furthermore, these skills are important because they are necessary for joint attention, 
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another putative precursor for theory of mind. Joint attention occurs when two 
individuals engage in a triadic interaction. That is, when two people simultaneously 
attend to each other and some object of interest (D'Entremont, Yazbek, Morgan, & 
MacAulay, 2007). Joint attention has been identified as a building block for theory of 
mind because it requires the infant to have some understanding that other people have 
perspectives and intentions (Bretherton, 1991). Indeed, some theorists argue that infants' 
gaze following and joint attention skills emerge at the same time as their realization that 
people are intentional beings (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; Tomasello, 1995). 
Recent research has focused on infants' understanding of intentionality as one of 
the earliest precursors for theory of mind. Intention can be used to denote deliberate 
action as opposed to accidental action (i.e., people do things intentionally) and to refer to 
the reason why something is done (i.e., people intend to do things; Astington, 2001). 
Unlike complex mental states such as belief, intentions do not involve representations or 
interpretations of the world. Instead, they reflect attitudes towards the external world or 
relations with it (Astington, 2001). Because intentions may be construed non-
representationally, they may be easier to understand. Indeed a developmental progression 
from understanding desires and intentions to understanding beliefs has been reported 
during the preschool period (Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Gopnik, 1993; Wellman, 1990, 
1993). There have been numerous studies examining infants' understanding of intention 
in action and intention in the mind. For example, investigations have shown that infants 
can segment continuous human actions into units that coincide with an actor's intentions 
(e.g., Baird & Baldwin, 2001), make inferences about the goals underlying other people's 
behavior (e.g., Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Meltzoff, 1995), and 
5 
preferentially imitate intentional over accidental actions (Carpenter, Akhtar, & 
Tomasello, 1998; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2005). These studies all indicate that infants 
possess some form of intention understanding early on. 
Taken together, research on putative precursors of theory of mind has provided 
strong evidence for the notion that theory of mind emerges gradually. As a result, most 
cognitive developmental scientists now emphasize a developmental perspective when 
studying theory of mind (e.g., Sodian & Thoermer, 2008; Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000). 
However, in a recent controversial study, Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) suggested that 
15-month-old infants may already have a representational understanding of the mind. 
These researchers designed a nonverbal false belief task, based on the violation of 
expectation paradigm. Infants were shown movies depicting an actor hiding a toy in one 
of two boxes. After a familiarization period, infants' witnessed a change that resulted in 
the actor having a true or false belief about the location of the toy. During the test trial, 
infants observed the actor put her hand in one of the two boxes and their looking time 
was coded. Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) found that infants expected the actor to search 
for her toy in the box that she believed it to be hidden and they were surprised (i.e., 
looked significantly longer) when she did not. Based on these results, Onishi and 
Baillargeon (2005) concluded that 15-month-olds possess an implicit rudimentary 
understanding of false belief. 
Onishi and Baillargeon's (2005) paper fueled the contentious debate that exists 
among cognitive developmental scientists concerning: (1) how these types of infant 
behaviors should be interpreted, and (2) the depth of infants' understanding of the mind. 
Some investigators (such as Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) favor rich interpretations, 
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crediting infants with some understanding of mental states. Others prefer leaner, less 
mentalistic, explanations of infants' action. For instance, it has recently been argued that 
infants' abilities to predict how a person will act could be based simply on learned rules 
about behavior rather than on a conception that the mind mediates behavior (Perner & 
Ruffman, 2005). Sirois and Jackson (2007) have also criticized Onishi and Baillargeon's 
(2005) rich interpretation by highlighting methodological confounds and statistical 
limitations inherent in their study. For example, these researchers posited that infants' 
looking times on the belief-induction trials may have reflected their sensitivity to 
perceptual variations among these trials (e.g., objects moved, direction of movement) 
rather than their conceptual knowledge per se. According to Sirois and Jackson (2007), 
future research using Onishi and Baillargeon's (2005) design should employ a statistical 
approach based on regression analyses in order to examine infants' looking time patterns 
more closely. From Sirois and Jackson's (2007) perspective, the field has yet to provide 
compelling evidence that infants possess some high-order social cognitive abilities. 
One way to clarify the depth of infants' understanding of the mind is to determine 
whether there is continuity between infants' early social-cognitive abilities and their later, 
more advanced, theory of mind skills. If infants have some basic knowledge of mental 
states, their performance on tasks tapping into early theory of mind should be linked to 
their performance on theory of mind tasks administered in the preschool years. Such 
correlations would provide empirical evidence to support the notion that children 
gradually converge on an "adult-like" theory of mind. To date, only a handful of 
longitudinal studies on na'ive psychology development have been conducted. Recent 
investigations have focused on examining the association between infants' attention to 
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human action, as measured by infant habituation paradigms, and later theory of mind. For 
example, Wellman, Phillips, Dunphy-Lelii, andLalonde (2004) tested 14-month-olds 
using a preferential looking task designed to examine infants' understanding of people's 
behavior from their gaze and facial expressions (Phillips et al., 2002). When these infants 
were approximately 4 years old, they were re-tested with a battery of theory of mind tasks 
(i.e., Theory of Mind Scale, Wellman & Liu, 2004). Interestingly, Wellman and his 
colleagues (2004) found that that infants' decrement of attention to intentional action was 
positively correlated with their later theory of mind skills. Similar results were recently 
reported by Aschersleben, Hofer, and Jovanovic (in press), who found that infants' 
decrement of attention to goal-directed action at 6 months was positively correlated with 
their performance of a standard false-belief task at 4 years of age. It is possible that these 
longitudinal relations may simply reflect a tendency for more advanced infants to 
perform better on cognitive tasks in preschool (Wellman, Lopez-Duran, Labounty, & 
Hamilton, 2008). As such, Wellman et al. (2008) conducted a longitudinal study that 
included control tasks which were administered at the preschool age. Their results 
replicated previous findings in that infants' attention to human action was significantly 
linked to later theory of mind (as measured by the false belief task). Importantly, 
Wellman et al. (2008) found that this infant-to-preschool relation remained significant 
even when measures of more general cognitive processes (e.g., verbal competence, 
general IQ, and executive function) were controlled. These results provide evidence to 
support the hypothesis that there are longitudinal links between infant and preschool 
theory of mind abilities, when infant measures of attention during habituation are 
employed. 
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Are there similar longitudinal associations when other methodologies are used? 
Preliminary results from three studies suggest that there are. First, Youngblade and Dunn 
(1995) found that children who engaged in more pretend play when they were 33 months 
of age were better at identifying feelings and recognizing false beliefs 7 months later. 
Research has also uncovered associations between infants' joint attention abilities at 20 
months and their performance on theory of mind tasks at 44 months of age (Charman et 
al., 2000). Finally, Olineck and Poulin-Dubois (2005) found that infants who were more 
likely to imitate intentional actions at 14-18 months had a larger internal state lexicon at 
32 months. Further research is needed to determine whether there is continuity between 
infants' social cognitive abilities and later theory of mind, regardless of what 
methodology is used. In addition to clarifying the developmental progression of theory of 
mind from infancy to childhood, it is important for cognitive developmental scientists to 
critically examine the validity of the tasks being used to tap into preverbal infants' 
understanding of the mind. 
One way of obtaining empirical evidence to support the validity of these 
nonverbal methodologies is to determine whether infants' performances on tasks that are 
presumably tapping into related constructs are related. The first paper of the present 
dissertation sought to address this issue by investigating whether infants' performances 
on visual attention and imitation tasks are linked. A short-term longitudinal study of 
goal/intention understanding was conducted with infants from 10 to 14 months of age. 
The first objective of this study was to examine whether 10-month-old infants' 
performances on two visual attention tasks would be related to their performances on two 
imitation tasks administered four months later. The second objective of this study was to 
9 
investigate whether there would be associations between infants' concurrent 
performances on the two visual attention tasks at 10 months and the two imitation tasks at 
14 months. Results from this short-term longitudinal study provide preliminary evidence 
to support the validity of some infant intention tasks and lend credence to the 
developmental continuity hypothesis. However, a more stringent test of developmental 
continuity requires longer term follow-up, where children's theory of mind skills are 
examined in infancy and again during the preschool period. 
The second paper in the present dissertation systematically addressed this issue by 
examining the relationship between children's imitation of intentional actions and general 
language skills in infancy, internal state language in toddlerhood, and theory of mind in 
the preschool period. For this study, children who initially participated in an imitation 
task when they were 14 or 18 months old, and whose parents provided information 
regarding their internal state lexicon at 32 months, were re-tested with a battery of theory 
of mind tasks when they were approximately 55 months old. This study was designed to 
examine whether there is a relationship between children's implicit understanding of 
intention in infancy and their more explicit understanding of intention during the 
preschool years. This research also investigated whether infants' performance on an 
intention task in the second year of life would be related to their general concept of mind 
later on, as measured by the false belief task and the Theory of Mind Scale (Wellman & 
Liu, 2004). Finally, this study examined whether there is continuity between young 
children's general language use, internal state vocabulary, and later theory of mind 
abilities. Together the two papers presented in this dissertation provide empirical 
evidence to support the validity of tasks currently being used to measure infants' early 
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understanding of intention, as well as further investigate the hypothesis that there is 
continuity in social cognition between infancy and early childhood. 
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Chapter 2 
Infants' Understanding of Intention from 10 to 14 months: Inter-relations Among 
Visual Attention and Imitation Tasks 
Kara M. Olineck and Diane Poulin-Dubois 
Concordia University 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
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Contribution of Authors 
This section describes the contributions made by the first author in the article 
entitled "Infants' understanding of intention from 10-14 months: Inter-relations among 
visual attention and imitation tasks". This experiment was conducted in the Cognitive 
Development Laboratory in the Centre for Research in Human Development at 
Concordia University, Montreal. 
With respect to planning, the first and second author devised experimental 
methods and the research design collaboratively. In preparation for testing, the first 
author worked closely with a carpenter to create experimental stimuli (e.., replicates of 
the materials used by previous researchers). The first author also produced detailed 
scripts describing the action sequences and/or live demonstrations to be used during 
testing. The first author collaborated with a research assistant to create the digitized 
videos depicting action sequences that were used during one of the visual attention tasks. 
For this task, the first author also conducted a pilot study with 10 adult participants, in 
order to ensure the suitability of the stimuli used. The first author devised administration 
orders (i.e., counterbalancing) and worked with the research assistant to program the 
events into habituation software. 
In terms of data collection, the first author wrote recruitment letters and consent 
forms for this study, in addition to recruiting English-speaking participants. Twenty-six 
participants were tested at 10 months and 20 of these infants returned to the laboratory 
when they were approximately 14 months of age. The first author was present for all of 
these testing sessions. With English-speaking families, the first author explained the 
study procedures and rationale to parents, and was actively involved in the administration 
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of the experiment. With French-speaking participants (n=l 1), a research assistant 
explained the study procedures to parents, but the first author remained involved in the 
administration of the experiment (e.g., actor during live demonstration included in the 
goal-detection task). During the visual attention tasks, infants' looking times were coded 
live by a research assistant. For the imitation tasks, the first author coded children's 
behavior by re-watching recordings of the test session. A research assistant, who was not 
informed of the study hypotheses, re-coded the data for reliability purposes and re-
entered the data to ensure its accuracy. The first author subsequently entered the data into 
an SPSS worksheet and conducted the analyses. The first author also wrote letters to 
parents describing the research findings and thanking them for their participation. 
The first author wrote the abstract, methods, and results sections of this paper, 
with comments and revisions provided by the second author. The introduction and 
discussion sections of this paper were written by both authors collaboratively. This paper 
has been submitted for publication. 
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Abstract 
The present study examined infants' understanding of other people's intentional actions. 
The primary goal was to investigate whether infants' performances on visual attention 
and imitation tasks that have been designed to tap understanding of intentional actions 
were interrelated. Infants completed a goal detection task and an action-parsing task at 10 
months. At 14 months, infants completed a behavioral re-enactment task and a selective 
action imitation task that required infants to differentiate intentional from accidental 
actions. Infants' concurrent performances on visual attention tasks were linked; however, 
no association was found between their performances on imitation tasks. Importantly, 
infants' behaviors on the visual attention tasks predicted their performance on the 
imitation tasks at 14 months. These findings provide the first evidence that there is 
developmental continuity in infants' understanding of intentional action from 10 to 14 
months. 
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Infants' understanding of intention from 10 to 14 months: Inter-relations among visual 
attention and imitation tasks 
Over the past two decades, there has been an upsurge of studies focused on how 
children gradually converge on an adult-like folk psychology, or "theory of mind". It has 
been proposed that understanding intention may one of the first steps towards developing 
a theory of mind (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Intention denotes 
deliberate action, and refers to the reason why something is done. Unlike complex mental 
states such as beliefs, intentions do not involve representations or interpretations of the 
world, but rather attitudes toward it or relations with it (Astington, 2001). As such, 
intentions may be construed non-representationally and may be easier to understand. 
Indeed, a developmental progression from understanding desires and intentions to 
understanding beliefs has been documented during the preschool period (Astington & 
Gopnik, 1991; Gopnik, 1993; Wellman, 1990, 1993; Wellman & Woolley, 1990). 
An important issue to consider is the foundation of intention understanding in 
infancy. Researchers have used a number of different methodologies to empirically 
measure infants' early understanding of intention in action and intention in the mind. For 
example, some understanding of intentionality has been documented in children's use of 
internal state words in naturalistic settings (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Bretherton & 
Beeghly, 1982; Shatz, Wellman, & Silber, 1983). In a longitudinal study of the verbal 
productions of 10 children between 1 and 6 years, Bartsch and Wellman (1995) reported 
that children's conversations about the mind begin early with talk about desires and 
intentions (e.g., want, wish) and that words in relation to beliefs appear later on (e.g., 
believe, know). Recent investigations of the developmental precursors of intention 
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understanding have revealed that this knowledge might be rooted in infants' analysis of 
people's actions. 
There is mounting evidence that even preverbal infants show a nascent 
understanding of intentional actions (Woodward, 2005). Using visual attention 
paradigms, researchers have demonstrated that infants as young as 6 months are capable 
of making goal attribution using cues such as hand gestures, gaze, and facial expressions. 
In her seminal paper, Woodward (1998) habituated infants to a scene where a human 
hand reached into a stage to grasp one of two toys. In the test trials, the position of the 
toys was switched and the infants saw the hand reach for either the same toy via a 
different path or the other toy via the original path. The results showed that infants as 
young as 6 months looked significantly longer when a new toy was grasped (i.e., new 
goal) compared to when the same toy (i.e., old goal) was grasped, even if the path of the 
hand movement remained the same. When they are a few months older, infants are able 
to interpret gaze as goal-directed, regardless of whether the actor is also pointing to the 
object or not. Poulin-Dubois (1999) first examined this issue by presenting 18- to 30-
month-old infants with video-taped events in which a person was shown looking and 
pointing at one of two objects. Each event was followed by the presentation of two still 
frames showing the actor grasping each of the two objects. Infants looked longer at the 
incongruent behavior (grasping the object not looked at) than the congruent behavior 
(grasping the object looked at). This finding suggested that infants expected the person to 
grasp the object that she had looked at previously and were surprised when the person 
reached for the previously ignored object. Using the habituation paradigm, a similar 
understanding that gaze involves a relation between a person and the object of his or her 
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gaze has been demonstrated in infants as young as 12 months (Woodward, 2003). Studies 
indicated that younger infants responded in a similar manner when they are presented 
with events that were identical to the looking events except that the actor also grasped the 
toy (Phillips et al., 2002; Sodian & Thoermer, 2004). Thus, it would appear that infants 
understand the link between looker and object by the end of the first year. 
Other recent studies have corroborated some form of "intention-in-action" 
understanding by examining infants' ability to identify, within a behavior stream, those 
components that coincide with an actor's initiation and completion of intentions. 
Research on adults' processing of complex human action indicates that viewers readily 
segment continuous everyday actions into units that coincide with an actor's goals and 
intentions (Newtson, 1973; Newtson & Engquist, 1976; Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer, 2001). 
Recently, researchers have examined whether infants as young as 10 months also 
segment continuous human action into units according to intentional boundaries (Baird & 
Baldwin, 2001; Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, & Clark, 2001). Results indicated that infants 
who had become familiar with videos depicting continuous sequences of everyday 
intentional actions (e.g., a woman reaches and grasps a towel on the kitchen's floor, then 
moves toward and places it on a towel rack) were subsequently relatively disinterested 
when motion was interrupted (i.e., paused) at points where intentions were fulfilled. In 
contrast, infants showed renewed interest when similar interruptions occurred in the 
midst of an actor's pursuit of intentions (Baird & Baldwin, 2001; Baldwin et al., 2001). 
These findings seem to suggest that infants as young as 10 months segment complex 
human behavior into units that coincide with the completion and initiation of intentional 
action. The extent of infants' action parsing skills was further examined in a recent study 
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conducted by Saylor, Baldwin, Baird, and Labounty (2007). Infants ranging from 9 to 11 
months were shown two simultaneous live events. Each live event involved an actor 
manipulating an object set (e.g., opening a drawer, placing a sock in a drawer). While the 
actors engaged in continuous purposeful action, auditory tones were presented. For one of 
the actors, the tones coincided with intention-relevant boundaries. For the other actor, 
random tones occurred in the midst of their action sequence. Interestingly, infants looked 
significantly longer at displays in which the auditory tone corresponded with the 
completion or initiation of an intentional action. This study provides further empirical 
evidence to suggest that young infants are sensitive to the intentional boundaries inherent 
in complex human action even in the case of novel actions. According to Baldwin and her 
colleagues (2001), it is possible that infants' early action parsing skills may be a 
prerequisite to the development of genuine intentional understanding. 
Recently, Behne, Carpenter, Call, and Tomasello (2005) demonstrated that around 
9 months of age, infants also make inferences about the goals underlying other peoples' 
body motions. In this innovative study, infants were offered a toy by a female 
experimenter. At times, the experimenter tried to pass the toy to the infant but was unable 
to do so (i.e., accidentally dropped the toy). Other times, the experimenter appeared to be 
"unwilling" to pass the toy to the infant (i.e., offered the toy and then pulled it back in a 
teasing manner). Behne et al. (2005) reported that 9-, 12-, and 18-month-olds were more 
impatient when the experimenter was unwilling to give the toy, compared to when she 
tried to pass the toy, but was unsuccessful. Because infants altered their responses 
according to their perceptions of the other person's goals, this investigation provides 
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further evidence to suggest that infants have developed some understanding of "intention-
in-action" by 9 months of age. 
Investigators have also examined infants' understanding of intention by 
capitalizing on their tendency to imitate human actions. In one of the earliest and most 
direct tests of infants' understanding of other people's intentions, Meltzoff (1995) 
showed 18-month-old infants an actor who tried, but failed, to perform several actions on 
objects. When given the opportunity to imitate the model, infants performed the action 
the experimenter intended to do (but never actually did) as often as those who had seen a 
demonstration in which the actor achieved his goal. This experiment has been replicated 
and extended in two recent cross sectional and longitudinal studies that tested 12-, 15-, 
and 18-month-olds. There appears to be a developmental progression in infants' ability to 
infer goal from surface behavior between 12 and 18 months of age (Bellagamba, 
Camaioni, & Colonnesi, 2006; Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999; Johnson, Booth, & 
O'Hearn, 2001). Another series of imitation studies have revealed similar changes in 
imitation understanding over the second year of life. Carpenter, Akhtar and Tomasello 
(1998) found that 14- to 18-month-olds were more likely to imitate an experimenter's 
intentional actions, after observing her randomly performing these two types of actions 
on an object. In order to systematically investigate a possible developmental progression 
similar to the one reported on the failed intention paradigm, Olineck and Poulin-Dubois 
(2005) recently replicated and extended these findings by testing separate groups of 14-
and 18-month-old infants. They found that infants' ability to differentiate intentional 
from accidental actions becomes more robust in this age range. 
20 
Together, these studies indicate that infants possess some form of understanding 
of other people's intentional actions. However, it is possible that the various tasks that 
have been designed to tap into infants' early understanding of intention are actually 
measuring different abilities. In other words, researchers have yet to systematically 
investigate whether the tasks used to tap infants' understanding of intention are 
measuring the same underlying skills, as currently implied in the extant literature. The 
goal of the present study was to clarify whether infants' performance across different 
measures of intention are linked. To our knowledge, the current study is the first to 
address this important issue. A short-term longitudinal study of goal/intentional action 
understanding between 10 and 14 months of age was conducted. If, as many researchers 
have argued, imitation and visual attention tasks are all measuring the same underlying 
construct (i.e., intention), one might expect that performance on these tasks would be 
interrelated. First, when infants were 10 months of age, two visual attention tasks were 
administered: the goal detection task (based on Woodward, 2003) and the action-parsing 
task (based on Baldwin et al., 2001). At 14 months of age, infants returned to the 
laboratory to complete a behavioral re-enactment task (based on Meltzoff, 1995) and a 
selective action imitation task that required infants to differentiate intentional from 
accidental actions (based on Carpenter, AJkhtar et al., 1998; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 
2005). It was hypothesized that there would be associations between infants' concurrent 
performance on the two visual attention tasks at 10 months and the two imitation tasks 
administered at 14 months. It was also expected that there would be developmental 




Twenty-six infants participated in a goal detection task and an action parsing task 
when they were 10 months of age. Four of these infants were excluded from initial 
analyses because they failed to habituate during one or both of the visual tasks (n=3) or 
because they did not complete the tasks (n=l). Therefore, 22 infants were included in the 
final sample for the goal detection and action parsing tasks (13 males, 9 females; 
M=10.50 months, 5D=0.24, range=10.03-10.89 months). Approximately 4 months later, 
20 of the infants included in the original sample returned to the laboratory to participate 
in 2 imitation tasks (11 males, 9 females; M=14.95 months, SD=0.49, range=14.10-15.85 
months). During their second visit to the laboratory, parents also completed the 
MacArthur Short Form Vocabulary Checklist: Level II Form A (MCDI: Fenson et al., 
2000). Infants were recruited from birth lists provided by a governmental health agency. 
Parents were initially sent a letter describing the purpose of the study and inviting them to 
participate (see Appendix A for a sample recruitment letter). 
Materials and Apparatus 
Goal detection task. The materials that were used included a child seat attached to 
a table that faced a stage, which was approximately 90 cm away. On the stage, a 
multicolored ball and a brown and white toy dog were positioned approximately 28 cm 
apart. An actor sat behind the stage. Above her head, a video lens was projected through 
a small hole in the back curtain of the stage, and was focused on the infant's face. During 
the testing session, an observer monitored the infant's visual fixation from behind the 
stage, using the video monitor and recording this information by pressing keys on the 
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computer keyboard. The computer program Habit (version 7.8) was used to record 
infant's looking times and calculate when the habituation criterion was met. 
Action parsing task. The materials that were used included a child seat attached to 
a table enclosed on three sides by a black wooden partition. On the table, approximately 1 
meter in front of the child was a computer monitor (43.2 cm). Directly above the 
computer monitor was a camera lens that protruded through a small hole in the partition 
and was focused on the infant's face. During the testing session, the experimenter 
monitored the infant's visual fixation from behind the front panel, using the video 
monitor and recording this information by pressing keys on the computer keyboard. The 
(6) 
computer program Habit (version 7.8) was used to present the movies on the monitor, 
record infant's looking times, and calculate when the habituation criterion was met. 
Infants were presented with two movies in which the same female actor was 
shown performing a sequence of simple actions using different toy props. The actor wore 
a red long-sleeved shirt and the backgrounds of both movies were black. In the 
habituation phase, infants were presented an 8 sec movie that displayed the actor 
performing a continuously flowing action. Once the infant had habituated to this movie, 
he/she was shown two different versions of the same movie. Both versions had a 1.5 sec 
still frame pause inserted at some point during the course of action. In the "completed" 
test video, the still frame pause was inserted at a point in time that corresponded with the 
completion of an intentional action. In the "interrupted" test video, the still frame pause 
was inserted at a point in time that did not correspond with the completion of an 
intentional action. 
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In one action sequence, the actor was shown looking straight ahead, turning her head 
down and to the right to look at a toy truck that was positioned at the top of a ramp, 
extending her arm out, touching the truck with her hand, reaching her hand back, and 
then moving her hand forward to push the truck down the ramp. Her hand remained in 
the final position as the toy truck rolled down the ramp and out of sight. In the 
"completed test video" that corresponded with this movie, a 1.5 sec pause was inserted 
just after the actor's hand touched the truck. In the "interrupted test video" that 
corresponded with this movie, a 1.5 sec pause was inserted just before her hand touched 
the truck. In the other action sequence, the same actor was shown looking straight ahead, 
turning her head down and to the right to look at a column of toys, reaching her arm out, 
grasping the top toy, lifting the toy up and off the column, and then dropping it into a 
container. Her hand stayed in the final position as the toy dropped from her hand and 
disappeared into the container. In the "completed test video" that corresponded with this 
movie, a 1.5 sec pause was inserted just after the actor grasped the toy. In the "interrupted 
test video" that corresponded with this movie, a 1.5 sec pause was inserted just before she 
grasped the toy. Each action sequence included only background noises that resulted 
from the action taken on the objects (e.g., sounds linked to pushing a truck down a ramp, 
or dropping a toy into a container). During a pilot study, 10 adult participants were shown 
the test movies and then asked to complete a brief questionnaire (e.g., during this movie, 
did you see a pause in the motion displayed by the agent? If yes, please indicate the 
segment of the movie where you believe the pause occurred by endorsing one of the four 
options). Adults' responses to this questionnaire confirmed that the still-frame pauses 
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inserted in the test movies either coincided with the completion of an intentional action or 
interrupted intentional action prior to completion. 
An additional film was used to reorient the infant's attention to the screen 
between trials. This "attention-getter" stimulus consisted of a computer-generated picture 
of a green circle expanding and contracting as the "ding" of a bell was repeated once per 
second. 
Selective action imitation task. The materials used for this task were the same as 
those used in Olineck and Poulin-Dubois (2005). A rectangular wooden box (38 cm long, 
25 cm wide, 9 cm tall) with six removable lids was designed. Embedded in the center of 
each of the box lids were toy devices that could be easily manipulated by the infant (e.g., 
handle that twists). Two of the box lids were always used in the warm-up phase of testing 
and the remaining four lids were randomly assigned to four experimental trials. One of 
the lids used in the warm-up phase of testing included one toy device and the remaining 
five box lids included two toy devices that were matched for size and level of 
attractiveness. The base of the box was visibly connected to a computer monitor via a 
telephone cord. Following the action demonstration, computer animations were 
surreptitiously activated by the experimenter and were displayed on the monitor. 
Behavioral re-enactment task. The materials used for this task closely resembled 
those used by Meltzoff (1995) and Bellagamba et al. (2006). Three colorful blocks were 
used during the warm-up phase. For the experimental trials, five novel object sets were 
used. Each of these objects consisted of at least two components that could be used to 
complete a target action. The object sets were: (1) a dumbbell that could be separated into 
two pieces, (2) a button embedded into a box that could be activated with a wooden 
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wand, (3) a loop that could be hung around a horizontally protruding prong, (4) a string 
of beads that could be put into a cylinder, and (5) a transparent plastic square with a hole 
that could be placed over a wooden dowel. 
Procedure and Design 
During both laboratory visits (i.e., time 1=10 months, time 2=14 months), 
participants were greeted by the experimenter and brought to a reception area. The nature 
and purpose of the study was explained to the parents and questions were addressed. 
Parents read and signed consent forms (see Appendix B), filled out a demographic 
questionnaire (see Appendix C), and completed the MCDI (i.e., during their second visit 
to the laboratory). Parents were also provided instructions regarding their behavior during 
the testing session (see Appendix D). Specifically, parents were discouraged from 
redirecting their infants back to the visual displays or encouraging them to complete any 
actions. After the familiarization period, infants were brought to the testing room and 
seated in a child's seat attached to a table. Their parent sat directly behind them. During 
the goal detection and action parsing tasks, the lights in the testing room were dimmed to 
ascertain that the visual display would attract the child's attention. 
Goal detection task. The procedure was based on Woodward (2003). The infant 
faced a small stage looking like a puppet-theatre on which there were two toys, a brown 
and white dog and a multicolored ball. An actor, wearing a long-sleeved red shirt, sat 
behind the stage with her face and upper body in clear view of the infant. Between trials, 
green curtains on each side of the stage were closed to hide the toys and actor from view. 
Each trial began with the curtains parting to reveal the two toys (28 cm apart from one 
another) and the actor. The actor made eye contact with the infant, said "Hi" and then 
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"Look" as she turned to gaze at one of the two toys. She stayed in this position until the 
end of the trial. If the infant did not make eye contact with the actor at the beginning of 
the trial, the actor repeated her greeting until the infant did so. Then, she said "Look" as 
she turned to gaze at one of the toys. The experimenter who was coding the infant's 
looking time was able to see the actor from behind, and thus began coding as soon as the 
actor had stopped moving and was in her final position (i.e., looking at the toy). The trial 
ended when the infant had looked away for two consecutive seconds or when 120 
seconds had elapsed. 
During the habituation trials, the actor always looked at the same toy. The 
habituation phase ended when the total looking time for three successive trials was less 
than 50% of the infant's total looking time during the first three habituation trials, or after 
a maximum of 14 trials. Once the infant had habituated, the computer program produced 
a "bing" sound that signaled the beginning of the test phase. The position of the toys 
behind the curtain was reversed before the test phase began. During the test phase, infants 
were presented with two types of test trials in alternation for a total of six trials. In the 
"new toy" test event, the actor turned to the same side as during habituation, thus gazing 
at a different toy than the one she had gazed at during habituation. In the "old toy" test 
event, she oriented to the other side of the stage and gazed at the same toy as during 
habituation, now located on the other side of the stage. As in the habituation phase, the 
actor made eye contact with the infant and said "Hi" and then said "Look" as she turned 
to gaze at one of the toys. Once again, test trials began when the actor had reached her 
final position and ended when the infant looked away for two consecutive seconds. 
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For half of the infants, the actor turned to the left side of the stage during the 
habituation phase, for the other half she turned to the right. For each direction, half of the 
infants saw the actor looking at the dog and half saw her looking at the ball. In addition, 
half of the infants began the test phase with a new toy trial and half began with an old toy 
trial. 
Action parsing task. The procedure was based on Baldwin et al. (2001). Infants 
completed this task in two parts. Specifically, they were habituated to one movie and then 
shown the test trials that corresponded to that movie. Following the first movie, infants 
remained in their seat and parents played with them while the experimenter prepared the 
computer program to run the second movie (i.e., approximately 60 seconds elapsed 
between viewings). After this short break, infants were habituated to the second movie 
and then shown the test trials that corresponded to that movie. The experimental session 
began with the activation of the attention-getter to draw the infant's attention to the 
computer screen. As soon as the child looked at the screen, the experimenter pressed a 
key to stop the attention getter and begin presentation of the first movie. During the first 
habituation phase, infants watched consecutive trials of the unjunctured action sequence. 
Because this was an infant-controlled procedure, infants' looking time determined the 
length of each habituation trial. The 8 sec movie was looped repeatedly (up to 5 times) 
for a maximum trial length of 40 sec. Once infants had looked away for 2 consecutive 
seconds, or 40 sec had elapsed, the trial ended. Prior to the initiation of a new trial, 
infants were always oriented to the computer screen via the attention-getter. Infants' 
looking time was determined on-line by the experimenter who was coding visual fixation 
from the video monitor located behind the apparatus. The habituation phase ended when 
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the total looking time during three successive trials was less than 50% of the infant's total 
looking time during the first three habituation trials, or after a maximum of 12 trials. 
Once the infant had habituated, or had seen 12 habituation trials, the test phase 
began. Each infant saw 4 test trials: two "completed" test trials and two "interrupted" test 
trials. As in the habituation phase, infants were oriented toward the computer screen via 
the attention-getter at the start of each trial. The trial ended when they had looked away 
for 2 consecutive seconds or when the maximum trial length (48 sec) had elapsed. The 
order of the movies shown and the order of the test trials were counterbalanced across 
participants. Also, the order in which the 10-month-olds completed this task and the goal-
detection task was counterbalanced. 
Selective action imitation task. The procedure was adapted from Carpenter and 
her colleagues (1998) and is described in detail in Olineck and Poulin-Dubois (2005). 
After two warm-up trials designed to familiarize infants with the imitation task, infants 
were shown live demonstrations in which the investigator modeled a sequence of two 
actions, using the toy devices. One of the actions was portrayed as accidental and the 
other as intentional. While completing the accidental action, the investigator looked away 
from the box lid, and then put her had to her mouth, and said "Whoops". Her facial 
expression was also surprised and her upper body jumped up slightly. While completing 
the intentional action, the investigator leaned forward slightly, gazed at one of the 
specific devices, and completed the action slowly. She also smiled and said "There". 
After the experimenter demonstrated the action sequence, a computer animation was 
displayed. Then, infants were given a turn to manipulate the devices in order to activate 
the computer animation. If infants only reproduced the accidental action, the computer 
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animation was not activated. Instead, the investigator proceeded to the next experimental 
trial. During the test phase, the order of the action sequence (i.e., accidental-intentional or 
intentional-accidental) alternated across the four trials. In addition, the side of the 
intentional action was counterbalanced, as well as the order in which the four 
experimental box lids were presented. Infants' responses during this task were video-
taped for coding purposes. 
Behavioral re-enactment task. The procedure was based on Meltzoff (1995) and 
Bellagamba et al. (2006). The testing session began with a warm-up phase in which the 
infant was presented with three colorful blocks to explore. Once the infant was 
comfortable with the experimenter and the testing room, the blocks were removed and the 
experimental trials commenced. Specifically, the infant was tested on the "Demonstration 
of Intention" condition of the re-enactment task (Meltzoff, 1995). For each of the test 
trials, the experimenter presented an object and said "I have something to show you. 
Watch me". Then, the experimenter modeled the intention to perform an act three times. 
For the dumbbell object, the experimenter held a wooden cube in each hand and appeared 
as though she was trying to pull the toy apart in two halves. However, she failed to do so 
because one of her hands slips off the cube as she pulled. While modeling this action 
three times, the actor's hand slips off alternating ends of the object (i.e., right side, left 
side). For the box with the embedded button, the experimenter attempted to use the wand 
to press the button but always missed (i.e., came down on the surface of the box instead). 
For each demonstration, the actor "missed" the button by hitting in a different location 
(i.e., too far right, left, and too high above the button). For the horizontal prong device, 
the experimenter picked up the loop but "accidentally" drops it as she approached the 
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prong. During the three demonstrations, the loop was "accidentally' released in different 
locations (i.e., too far left, too far right, and just below the prong). For the cylinder and 
beads, the experimenter dropped the beads so that they just missed the cylinder and fell 
onto the table instead. During one demonstration, the beads were dangled so they 
connected with the edge of the cylinder but then fell to one side. On another 
demonstration, the beads were dropped too far in front of the cup. On the final 
demonstration, the beads were gathered in the experimenter's hand, scraped over the 
opening of the cylinder, and then dropped to the other side. For the plastic square and 
dowel, the experimenter attempted to put the square on the dowel but was unable to line 
it up properly. During these three demonstrations, the experimenter placed the square too 
far left, too far right, and then too far in front of the dowel. Importantly, the experimenter 
had no linguistic expressions or facial expressions regarding her failed attempts. 
Following the demonstration, the experimenter offered the object to the child and said 
"Now it's your turn". Infants were provided with a 20 sec response period before the next 
object was introduced. The order in which the object sets were presented was 
counterbalanced across participants. Following the "Demonstration of Intention" 
condition, infants completed a post-test, in which they were shown a demonstration of the 
target action and then given a turn to reproduce this action. The purpose of this post-test 
was to determine whether infants possessed the motor skills required to complete each 
target action. Infants were not provided feedback following their response and their 
behaviors during this task were video-taped for coding purposes. 
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Coding and Reliability 
Goal-detection task. As previously described, infants' looking time during the 
testing session was coded live. As such, the primary experimenter coded the data for 
infants' looking time. A random selection of 20% of participants (n=5) was recoded by 
another experimenter for reliability purposes. Using Pearson product moment 
correlations, the mean inter-rater agreement for the infants' looking time was r=.99. As 
outlined by Woodward (2003), it was also critical to determine whether infants followed 
the actor's gaze during this task. On a second pass of the tapes, infants' looks to each of 
the two toys during the test trials were coded by the primary experimenter. The coder was 
not informed of the particular test condition being observed, and could not see the toys or 
the actor. A random selection of another 5 infants was recoded by a second experimenter. 
Using Pearson product moment correlations, the mean inter-rater agreement for the 
infants' looking time was r=.96. 
Action parsing task. Infants' looking time during the testing session was also 
coded live. As such, the primary experimenter coded the data for infants' looking time. A 
random selection of 20% of participants (n=5) was recoded by another experimenter for 
reliability purposes. Using Pearson product moment correlations, the mean inter-rater 
agreement for the infants' looking time was r=.99. 
Selective action imitation task. Each participant was videotaped and all tapes were 
coded by the primary investigator. The coding scheme for this experiment was modeled 
after the one used by Carpenter et al. (1998). Infants were coded as having manipulated a 
device (i.e., reproduced an action) if their attention was directed at the device and they 
were obviously attempting a manipulation. In the warm-up trials, infants' abilities to 
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imitate actions were coded. All infants successfully reproduced the actions demonstrated 
in both warm-up trials. In the test phase, infants' actions on each device, and the order in 
which the actions occurred, were coded. If infants repeatedly manipulated one device 
(e.g., pushed button several times) it was coded as the same action. In the cases where 
infants manipulated both devices at the same time they were coded as completing the 
actions simultaneously. Infants who touched one device while actively manipulating the 
other device were coded as reproducing the action associated with the device occupying 
their attention. A sample of the document that was used for coding this task is included in 
Appendix E. In order to establish inter-rater reliability, 20% of the data (n=5) were coded 
by a second coder. There was 98% agreement between the two coders. 
Behavioral re-enactment task. Each participant was videotaped and all tapes were 
coded by the primary investigator. The coding scheme was modeled after Meltzoff 
(1995) and Bellagamba et al. (2006). For each test trial, children were given 20 seconds 
to manipulate the object, beginning with his or her first touch of the object. The 
experimenter coded whether or not infants completed the target action during this 
response period. For the dumbbell, a "yes" was coded if the infant pulled the object apart. 
For the box, a "yes" was coded if the infant used the wooden wand to push the button. 
For the prong, a "yes" was coded if the infant hung the loop around the protruding prong. 
For the beads, a "yes" was coded if the infants placed the beads into the cylinder. Finally, 
for the plastic square, a "yes" was coded if the infant placed the square over the wooden 
dowel so that the dowel protruded from the hole. These criteria were used to code infants' 
responses during the "Demonstration of Intention" condition and the post-test that 
followed. A sample of the document that was used for coding this task is included in 
33 
Appendix F. To establish inter-rater reliability, 20% of the data (n=5) were coded by a 
second coder. There was 100% agreement between the two independent coders. 
Results 
Goal detection task. Before examining whether infants were sensitive to goal-
directed actions, it was important to confirm that infants had in fact habituated to the live 
demonstration provided during the habituation phase. Indeed, infants' average looking 
time on the last block of three familiarization trials (M=6.98, 5D=2.48) was significantly 
less than their average looking time on the first block of three familiarization trials 
(M=17.15, SD=5.92), t(2\)=ll.72,p<.05. Next, planned contrasts were conducted to 
examine whether infants looked longer on the new toy test trials compared to the old toy 
test trials. Results indicated that infants' mean looking time for new toy trials (M=8.02, 
SD—3.42) was not significantly different from their mean looking time for old toy trials 
(M=7.61, 5D=4.34), t(2l)=.50,p>.05. However, when the looking times for only the first 
trial were compared, results indicated that infants looked significantly longer at the new 
toy trial (Af=l 1.73, £0=6.34) compared to the old toy trial (Af=8.04, SD=5.02), t(2l)=-
2.33, p<M. 
Importantly, analyses also confirmed that infants were following the actor's eye 
gaze during this task. The proportion of the trial spent looking at the object of the actor's 
gaze and the proportion of looking time at the other toy was calculated for each 
participant. Infants' mean proportion of time that they spent looking at the object of the 
actor's gaze (M=.28, SD=A3) was significantly higher than the proportion of time they 
spent looking at the other toy (Af=17, SD=.lO), t(\9)=3.27,p<.05. 
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Action parsing task. Preliminary analyses indicated that infants' looking times 
toward the two digitized videos (i.e., action sequences) were similar. Moreover, there was 
no significant interaction between action sequence and type of test video (i.e., completed 
video vs. interrupted video). As such, the data was collapsed across the two digitized 
videos in subsequent analyses. 
Prior to examining whether infants detected disruptions in the structure of 
intentional action, it was important to confirm that infants had in fact habituated to the 
uninterrupted videos presented in the habituation phase. Indeed, infants' average looking 
times on the last block of three familiarization trials (M=10.37, SD=4.33) was 
significantly less than their average looking time on the first block of three 
familiarization trials (M=22.93, SD= 10.40), paired f(21)=6.82,/><.05. Next, planned 
comparisons were conducted in order to determine whether infants demonstrated renewed 
interest in response to the test videos, relative to their looking time on the last habituation 
trial (M=5.77, SD=4.09). Interestingly, infants' looking time was significantly higher for 
the first interrupted video (M=7.71, £D=5.74), f(21)=1.65, one-tailedp=.05. Infants 
showed no such renewed interest in response to the first completed test video (M=5.77, 
5D=4.49), paired ^(21)=.002, one-tailedp>.05. Infants' looking times on the two test 
videos were also compared. Overall, infants did not look significantly longer on the 
interrupted test videos (M=7.83, SD-5.07) compared to the completed test videos 
(Af=7.24, 5D=3.91), t(2l)=0.52,p<.05. However, 15 of the 22 infants did look longer at 
the interrupted test videos than at the completed test videos, sign test, one-tailedp=.06. It 
is possible that infants became confused and/or less attentive due to the repetition of test 
events. To address this issue, infants' responses during the first trial were examined. 
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Analyses revealed that, when looking times for the first trial of each test video were 
isolated, infants looked longer at the interrupted test video (M=7.7l, SD=5.74) than the 
completed test video (M=5.77,-50=4.49), <21)=1.78, one-tailed jX.05. 
Selective action imitation task. To calculate the percentage of intentional and 
accidental actions reproduced, the number of each type of actions reproduced (maximum 
score=4) was divided by the total number of times the action was modeled (i.e., 4 of each 
action type) and multiplied this number by 100. These data were submitted to a repeated 
measures analysis of variance with action type (i.e., intentional vs. accidental) as a within 
subjects factor. As expected, there was a significant effect of action type, F(l, 19)=5.59, 
p<.05. Overall, infants imitated significantly more intentional (M=92.50, 50=14.28) 
actions than accidental (M=80.00, 50=19.19) actions. In the next series of analyses, 
planned comparisons were conducted to more closely examine trials in which infants 
imitated only one action (range=0-3, M=l.l, SD=.91). Results indicated that the 
percentage of trials that infants reproduced only the intentional action (M=20.00, 
50=19.19) was significantly greater than the percentage of trials they completed only the 
accidental action (M=7.75,50=14.28), paired f(19)=2.36,/?<.05. These results are 
consistent with results reported in previous studies. For example, Olineck and Poulin-
Dubois (2005) found that infants reproduced 95.26% of intentional actions (out of times 
they were modeled) and 75.39% of accidental actions (out of times they were modeled). 
Behavioral re-enactment task. Each infant was assigned a score ranging from 0 to 
5 according to how many target actions they reproduced. The mean number of target 
actions reproduced was 1.45 (range= 0 to 4, median=1.00, 50=1.15). As such, infants' 
abilities to complete these actions (i.e., post event actions) were also taken into 
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consideration. To calculate the percentage of target actions completed relative to the 
number of actions they were able to reproduce, the number of target actions infants 
completed during the test phase was divided by the total number of actions they were 
able to complete during the post test and this number was multiplied by 100. On average, 
infants completed 43.60% of the target actions they were able to re-enact (range=0 to 
100, median=40.00, SD=29.2S). 
Relationship between tasks. In order to maximize the sample size and the 
statistical power, as well as increase variability, three infants who were previously 
excluded because they did not habituate during the visual attention tasks administered at 
10 months were included in the following analyses. Thus, for correlations between tasks 
administered at 10 months, the sample included 25 infants. For correlations between tasks 
administered at 14 months, the sample included 20 infants. Finally, for correlations 
between 10- and 14-month-old tasks, the sample consisted of 19 infants (i.e., one of the 
infants tested at 14 months was not included in the final sample at 10 months). 
To represent infants' performance on the goal-detection task, two dependent 
variables were utilized: (1) the difference between the infants' looking time during the 
first new toy trial and their looking time during the first old toy trial (i.e., Difference 
Score= looking time during the first new toy trial-looking time during the first old toy 
trial) (M=3.07, SD=7.95), (2) infants' weighted decrement of attention score (i.e., 
Weighted Decrement of Attention Score = (looking time for habituation trial 1 + looking 
time for habituation trial 2) - (looking time during 2nd to last habituation trial + looking 
time during last habituation trial) / (looking time for habituation trial 1 + looking time for 
habituation trial 2) (M=.56, £D=.33). Recent research has shown that infants' weighted 
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decrement of attention score predicts their theory of mind abilities later on (Wellman et 
al., 2008; Wellman et al., 2004). To represent infants' performance on the action parsing 
task, two dependent variables were utilized: (1) the difference between infants' average 
looking time during the first interrupted test videos and their average looking time during 
the first completed test videos (i.e., Difference Score=mean looking time during the first 
interrupted test videos -mean looking time during the first completed test videos (i.e., 
collapsed across the two movies; M= -.10, SD= 10.58), (2) infants' weighted decrement 
of attention score (i.e., Weighted Decrement of Attention Score = (looking time for 
habituation trial 1 + looking time for habituation trial 2) - (looking time during 2nd to last 
habituation trial + looking time during last habituation trial) / (looking time for 
habituation trial 1 + looking time for habituation trial 2; M=.60, SD=30). To represent 
infants' performance on the selective action imitation task, two dependent variables were 
utilized: 1) the difference between the percentage of time children reproduced the 
intentional action (out of 4) and the percentage of time they imitated the accidental action 
(out of 4) (i.e., Difference Score = % intentional actions imitated - % of accidental 
actions completed) (M=T2.5, SD=23.65, range=-25-50), 2) the percentage of time they 
imitated the intentional action first (M=57.5, SD=20.03, range=25-100). These two 
dependent variables were selected because they have previously been used to represent 
infants' performance on the selective action imitation task in other studies (e.g., Olineck 
& Poulin-Dubois, 2007). To represent infants' performance on the behavioral re-
enactment task, two dependent variables were utilized: (1) infants' total target score 
(M=1.45, 5D=1.15), (2) the percentage of target actions completed out of the number of 
actions infants were able to complete (i.e., number of target action completed during test 
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phase / number of target actions that the infant was able to complete taking post test into 
account, multiplied by 100; M=43.6, SD=29.2&, range = 0 to 100). Finally, to represent 
infants' receptive language skills, the total number of words the infant understood 
(M=33.45, 5D=19.44, range = 8 to 83) was utilized. To examine whether there was a link 
between infants' performance on these intention tasks and/or their receptive language 
skills, Pearson correlations were computed between all dependent variables. These 
correlations are presented in Table 1. 
The first question of interest was whether infants' performance on the two visual 
attention tasks administered at 10 months was related. Indeed, results indicated that 
infants' weighted decrement of attention score during the habituation phase of the goal 
detection task was positively correlated with the same variable on the action parsing task, 
r=38,p<.05, one-tailed. No significant correlations emerged between the difference 
scores obtained by infants on these tasks. 
The second question of interest was whether infants' concurrent performance on the two 
imitation tasks administered at 14 months would also be linked. Contrary to the 
hypotheses, there was no statistically significant relation between infants' concurrent 
performance on the two imitation tasks completed at 14 months. However, the correlation 
between the percentage of time infants completed the intentional action first (selective 
action imitation task) and the number of target actions they completed relative to the 
number of actions they were able to complete (i.e., taking their performance on the post 
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The third question of interest was whether infants' performance on the two tasks 
administered at 10 months predicted their performance on the two imitation tasks 
administered approximately four months later. Interestingly a significant relationship was 
found between infants' performance on the goal-detection task at 10 months and their 
subsequent performance on one of the imitation tasks administered at 14 months. 
Specifically, infants who obtained larger decrement of attention scores during the goal 
detection task also completed significantly more target actions during the behavioral re-
enactment task, r=.45,;?<.05. A consistent positive correlation emerged between infants' 
decrement of attention scores during the goal detection task and the percentage of target 
actions they completed during the behavioral re-enactment task, relative to the number of 
actions they were able to complete (i.e., taking performance during post test into 
account), r=.45,p<.05. 
Infants' performance on the action parsing task administered at 10 months was 
also linked to their performance on one of the two imitation tasks administered at 14 
months. Specifically, infants' decrement of attention score during the action parsing task 
predicted the number of target actions they completed during the behavioral re-enactment 
task, r=.43,p<.05. No significant correlations were found between infants' performance 
on the action parsing and selective action imitation tasks. 
The final question of interest was whether infants' performance on any of these 
nonverbal tasks were associated with their receptive language abilities at 14 months, as 




To investigate infants' understanding of goals and intentional actions, researchers 
have employed a number of different methodologies.-Some have used measures of 
habituation-dishabituation to demonstrate that infants are sensitive to goal-directed 
actions such as gestures or gaze (e.g., Woodward, 1998, 2003). Other studies examining 
infants' understanding of intention have used imitation paradigms (e.g., Carpenter, 
Akhtar et al., 1998; Meltzoff, 1995). Converging evidence from across the field of 
cognitive development has revealed that infants as young as 6 months are adept at 
detecting goals in others' actions with visual attention paradigms and as early as 14 
months with imitation paradigms. Currently, there is a broad consensus that infants can 
represent other people's actions in ways that are important for intentional understanding; 
however, there is no evidence that the same underlying skills are involved. In the present 
study, we sought to test whether the abilities assessed with these tasks are interrelated by 
using a within-subject design. 
The first contribution of the present study is the replication and extension of 
previous findings. Specifically, our data from the action parsing task confirmed that 10-
month-old infants possess skills for parsing continuous human action according to the 
initiation and completion of intentional actions (e.g., Baldwin et al., 2001; Saylor et al., 
2007). This replication is important because we presented infants with movies depicting 
an actor completing action sequences that were more novel than the "kitchen clean up 
activities" (e.g., reaching to grasp a towel and picking up an ice cream container) used by 
Baldwin et al. (2001). In discussing the interpretation of their findings, Baldwin and her 
colleagues (2001) argued that because the kitchen scenes were probably familiar to 
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infants in a general sense, comparable parsing success with objects and actions that were 
more novel needed to be demonstrated. Although the action sequences used in the present 
study (i.e., pushing a car down a ramp and dropping objects inside a container) are also 
somewhat familiar gestures for infants, the contexts that we designed for these actions 
was probably more novel. Recently, Saylor et al. (2007) showed infants live displays 
involving actors engaged in novel action sequences that were comparable to ours (i.e., 
opening a drawer, putting a sock inside a drawer). Once again, their results confirmed 
that 10-month-old infants segment continuous human action along intentional boundaries. 
We also replicated and extended previous findings in the second task 
administered to 10-month-olds. In her seminal paper, Woodward (2003) demonstrated 
that 12-month-olds, but not 7- and 9-month-olds, represent gaze in terms of the relation 
between the person and the object of his or her gaze. Our data indicate that this ability has 
developed by 10 months of age, although it is still fragile reflected in the fact that the 
effect was only observed on the first pair of test trials. 
With regard to the imitation tasks administered at 14 months, the present data are 
in accord with previous research reporting that children as young as 14 months can 
distinguish between intentional and accidental actions, even if this ability becomes more 
robust with age (Carpenter, Akhtar et al , 1998; D'Entremont & Yazbek, 2006; Olineck & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2005). It is noteworthy that infants in the present study tended to 
reproduce a large number of both intentional (92.50%) and accidental actions (80.00%). 
This may be interpreted by some as evidence to suggest that 14-month-olds are less likely 
to make a distinction between intentional and accidental actions. However, we would 
argue that these high response rates are indicative of the attractiveness of the stimuli and 
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infants' impulsivity at this age. Similar response rates have been cited in previous 
research. For example, Olineck and Poulin-Dubois (2005) found that infants' ranging 
from 14 to 18 months of age reproduced 95.26% of the intentional actions and 75.39% of 
the accidental actions that were modeled. Despite their tendency to reproduce both action 
types at high rates, infants' ability to distinguish intentional actions is reflected in their 
difference scores, their inclination to reproduce intentional actions first, and their 
tendency to reproduce only intentional actions (i.e., during trials where one action is 
reproduced). Together with previous research, the present study suggests that 14-month-
olds differentiate intentional from accidental action. It has been argued that infants' 
understanding of accidental actions is particularly important when assessing infants' 
understanding of others' intentions, because they involve the understanding that others 
may have intentions that may not match with the current state of affairs. This level of 
understanding is more advanced than the simple understanding that people may have 
intentions that differ from one's own. 
Another contribution of the present study was the administration of the 
demonstration of intention condition of the behavioral re-enactment task to 14-month-old 
infants (Meltzoff, 1995). Our sample of children performed more poorly than expected on 
this task. For example, in a recent longitudinal study, 12-month-olds produced the target 
action 26% of the time and 15-month-olds produced the target action 63%) of the time in 
the same Demonstration of Intention condition (Bellagamba et al., 2006). With a stuffed 
orangutan as a model, Johnson et al. (2001) observed that 15-month-olds produced the 
target action 37% of the time. In comparison, the 14-month-olds in the present study 
performed the target action on only 29% of the trials. However, when infants' ability to 
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complete the actions (i.e., performance on the post test) was taken into account, the 
success rate was comparable to other studies (i.e., infants' completed an average of 
43.60% of target actions). As such, it seems like the actions that were modeled were 
difficult for our sample of children to perform. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
there was significant variability in infants' performance on this task and that their 
performance on this task was found to be related with their performances on other tasks 
designed to measure intention understanding at 10 months. Beyond the replication and 
extension of previous work, the most important goal of the present study was to examine 
infants' understanding of intentional action across different measures. Given that 
independent data sets have revealed that 10- to 14-month-old infants have some 
understanding of intentional action, it was expected that there would be a relationship in 
infants' performance across these tasks, similar to the one reported in theory of mind 
tasks included in experiments on representational change with preschoolers (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988). To our knowledge, the present study is the first to employ a within-
subjects design to explore infants' understanding of intentional action using a number of 
different tasks designed to tap the same construct. 
Importantly, we found a number of interesting links between infants' performance 
on the different tasks used to measure understanding of intentional action. For instance, 
we uncovered a significant link between-infants' weighted decrement of attention scores 
during the goal detection task and their subsequent performance on the behavioral re-
enactment task. The fact that a significant link was uncovered using infants' decrement of 
attention score is consistent with other recent longitudinal studies which have shown that 
measures of infant social attention (i.e., decrement of attention during habituation to 
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displays of intentional action) are predictive of later theory of mind abilities (e.g., 
Aschersleben et al., in press; Wellman et al., 2008; Wellman et al., 2004). According to 
Wellman and his colleagues (2008), infants' attention during habituation is an 
informative measure because it reflects infants' ability to parse displays meaningfully 
during their initial exposure to them. 
Results from the present study also demonstrated that the weighted decrement of 
attention score that infants obtained during the action parsing task was related to their 
subsequent performance on the behavioral re-enactment task. We believe that this is a 
very exciting finding as both tasks involve incomplete intentional actions, suggesting that 
attention to the structure of intentional action may be a precursor to the ability to 
anticipate the intention behind a failed attempt. In a way, these findings provide indirect 
support for the hypothesis that the failed attempt task measures intention understanding at 
a behavioral level (intention-in-action) as opposed to a more abstract level (intention-in-
the-mind; (Meltzoff, 1995). 
As expected, there were also positive associations between infants' concurrent 
performance on the two visual attention tasks administered at 10 months. Specifically, 
infants' decrement of attention scores on the goal detection and action parsing tasks were 
positively correlated. This finding suggests that infants' information processing during 
the habituation phase was similar for both tasks. This significant correlation is 
impressive, given that a live event was presented in the goal-detection task, whereas 
movies were shown in the action parsing task. No such link was found between infants' 
sensitivity to the boundaries of intentional action (i.e., difference score during action 
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parsing task) and their ability to detect other people's goals (i.e., difference score during 
the goal detection task). 
A surprising result of the present investigation was that 14-month-olds' 
concurrent performances on the two imitation tasks were unrelated. It is possible that the 
selective action imitation and behavioral re-enactment tasks are tapping into different 
social cognitive abilities. The hypothesis that these tasks may tap into different skills is 
empirically supported by the fact that children with autism are able to complete the failed 
attempt task (Aldridge, Stone, Sweeny, & Bower, 2000; Carpenter, Pennington, & 
Rogers, 2001) but not the selective action imitation task (D'Entremont & Yazbek, 2006). 
During the selective action imitation task, infants were shown demonstrations that 
included vocalizations (i.e., "whoops" vs. "there"), facial expressions (i.e., surprise vs. 
contentment), different eye gaze patterns (i.e., looked away from device while 
performing accidental action, looked intently at device while performing intentional 
action), and different body posturing (e.g., body jumped slightly during the completion of 
accidental action). In contrast, the demonstrations provided during the behavioral re-
enactment task did not include linguistic or facial expressions. Perhaps infants' 
performance on the selective action imitation task reflects their sensitivity to social-
communicative cues. According to Tomasello et al. (2005), understanding intention 
involves understanding goal directed action and observable outcomes, as well as 
recognizing emotional reactions and other non-verbal behavior. Further research is 
needed to explore whether infants' performance on the selective action imitation task 
may be linked with their performance on other intention tasks that include social-
communicative cues. Nevertheless, research has shown that infants' performance on the 
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selective imitation task predicts their later use of internal state terms, as well as their 
performance on a preschool intention task (Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2005, 2007). These 
studies suggest that this imitation task is tapping into an understanding of intention that 
may be a precursor to later theory of mind. 
Importantly, results from the present study provide preliminary evidence to 
suggest that the action parsing and goal detection tasks may tap into the same ability to 
analyze intentional action as the behavioral re-enactment task. Interestingly, recent 
research has demonstrated that infants' performance on the behavioral re-enactment task 
at 12-15 months of age predicted their subsequent performance on tasks measuring 
perception and intention understanding at 39 months (Colonnesi, Rieffe, Koops, & 
Perucchini, in press). More research is needed to determine whether infants' performance 
on the failed-attempts task would also predict their later use of internal state language and 
their more general theory of mind skills (e.g., Theory of Mind Scale: Wellman & Liu, 
2004) in the preschool period. 
It is our belief that longitudinal investigations, using within subjects designs, 
represent an important new approach to study early social cognition development. Being 
able to understand others' intentions has been proposed as one of the first steps in the 
development of a theory of mind (Tomasello et al., 2005). Although, there are many 
studies reporting some form of goal or intention understanding in infancy, it is unknown 
whether these experimental procedures tap into the same underlying skills. The present 
study was the first in the field to explore this key issue. Our preliminary results suggest 
that there are empirical relationships between the visual attention and imitation measures 
currently being used to measure infants' early intentional understanding. It is possible 
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that these links reflect infants' developing understanding of intentional action. However, 
it is also possible that these links may be due to other determinants of task performance 
such as general intelligence, information processing speed, memory and/or executive 
function skills. Recent research has addressed this issue by including a variety of control 
tasks. For example, Yamaguchi, Kuhlmeier, Wynn, and vanMarle(in press) administered 
the Theory of Mind Scale (Wellman & Liu, 2004) to preschoolers who had previously 
participated in either a social attention task examining infants' ability to interpret goal 
directed action or a nonsocial attention task that measured infants' ability to discriminate 
temporal durations of sounds. They found that infants' looking time patterns in the infant 
social attention task, but not the nonsocial attention task, were linked with preschool 
theory of mind. These findings are important because they indicate that the 
developmental continuity in social cognition that was demonstrated from infancy to 
preschool was not simply due to general attentional or cognitive capacities that would 
have also affected performance on the nonsocial infant attention task. More longitudinal 
studies, with larger samples and a variety of control tasks, are essential to determine 
whether there is continuity in children's understanding of intentional action and whether 
the tasks currently being used to measure infants' implicit understanding of intention are 
tapping into the same underlying socio-cognitive abilities. 
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Chapter 3 
Imitation of Intentional Actions and Internal State Language in Infancy Predict 
Preschool Theory of Mind Skills 
Kara M. Olineck and Diane Poulin-Dubois 
Concordia University 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
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Contribution of Authors 
This section documents the contributions made by the first author to the article 
titled "Imitation of intentional actions and internal state language in infancy predict 
preschool theory of mind skills". This research was conducted in the Cognitive 
Development Laboratory in the Centre for Research on Human Development at 
Concordia University, Montreal. 
This study was designed by both authors collaboratively. Two research students, 
who were jointly supervised by the first and second authors, were also involved. In terms 
of the experimental set up, both authors worked with a carpenter to devise an apparatus 
used during one of the experimental tasks. The first author co-supervised the research 
students as they gathered additional stimuli, devised administration orders (i.e., 
counterbalancing), and drafted recruitment letters and consent forms. The first author 
created detailed scripts to be followed verbatim during testing, as well as coding sheets to 
be used during data collection. 
The initial infant study was part of the first author's Masters Thesis, which was 
also supervised by the second author. In terms of data collection for the follow-up 
experiments, the two research students recruited and tested approximately half of the 
participants (i.e., those children who were initially tested at 14 months). These testing 
sessions were frequently observed by the first author. The remaining participants (i.e., 
those initially tested at 18 months of age) were recruited and tested by the first author and 
a research assistant. With English-speaking families, the first author explained 
experimental procedures to parents and ran the experimental procedure. With French-
speaking participants, a research assistant explained procedures to parents and completed 
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experimental tasks with children. The first author was involved in testing these children 
at a more peripheral level (e.g., unseen actor manipulating experimental stimuli during 
one of the preschool tasks). The first author watched the recording of every testing 
session in order to code children's behavior during the tasks. The first author entered the 
data into an SPSS worksheet and conducted the analyses. A research assistant, who was 
not informed of the study hypotheses, re-coded the data for reliability purposes and re-
entered the data to ensure its accuracy. The first author wrote letters to parents describing 
the research findings and thanking them for their participation. 
The first author wrote the abstract, introduction, methods, and results sections of 
this paper, with the second author offering comments and revisions. Both authors 
collaborated in writing the discussion section. This paper was published in the European 
Journal of Developmental Psychology, 4, 14-30. 
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Abstract 
The present study examined whether infants' imitation of intentional actions, concurrent 
vocabulary, and later internal state lexicon was related to their "theory of mind" (ToM) at 
preschool age. Initially, 14- and 18-month-olds completed an imitation task on intentional 
action understanding. Concurrent general vocabulary and internal state language at 32 
months was also assessed. At approximately four years of age, children were re-tested 
with an interactive game measuring intention understanding, a false-belief task or the 
Theory of Mind Scale (Wellman & Liu, 2004), and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test. 
Infants' performance on the imitation task was related to their later concept of intention. 
Furthermore, internal state language was significantly correlated with later ToM. These 
findings suggest that there is developmental continuity between precursors to ToM in 
infancy and ToM in the preschool years. 
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Imitation of intentional actions and internal state language in infancy predict preschool 
theory of mind skills 
Adults are constantly making inferences about the mental states underlying 
human behavior, a process that is called "theory of mind" (ToM). We see people as 
having mental states, such as beliefs about the world and desires for objects, and we 
understand their behavior based on this knowledge. Research has demonstrated that by 
the time children reach 4 or 5 years of age, they have a similar understanding of people as 
psychological beings (Wellman et al., 2001). However, much less is known about the 
putative precursors of ToM in infancy. A common criticism of experiments investigating 
the origins of ToM in infancy is that it is unclear whether the tasks that have been 
designed to tap into infants' early concept of the mind are actually measuring what they 
are intended to measure. For instance, some researchers have argued that infants' ability 
to predict how a person will act could be based simply on learned rules about behavior 
rather than on a conception that the mind mediates behavior (Perner & Ruffman, 2005). 
One way of establishing the external validity of these tasks is to determine whether there 
is continuity between children's early social-cognitive abilities and their later, more 
advanced, ToM skills. To date, there are very few longitudinal studies that have 
addressed this important gap in the literature. Therefore, the main goal of the present 
investigation was to systematically examine the continuity between children's 
performance on ToM tasks in infancy and the preschool period. 
An active line of work has focused on infants' understanding of intentionality as 
the first step in developing a full-fledged ToM. Intention can be used to denote deliberate 
action as opposed to accidental action and to refer to the reason why something is done 
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(Astington, 2001). By the end of the first year, infants are learning to identify the 
intentions underlying other people's behavior. Specifically, they are sensitive to goal-
directed actions and can detect the goals of other people using cues such as eye gaze, 
reaching, and emotional expressions (Baird & Baldwin, 2001; Phillips et al., 2002; 
Woodward, 1998, 2003). During the second year of life, research has indicated that 
infants display a more advanced understanding of intention (e.g., Bellagamba & 
Tomasello, 1999; Meltzoff, 1995). For instance, in an investigation that aimed to uncover 
infants' implicit understanding of intention, Carpenter, Akhtar, and Tomasello (1998) 
modeled intentional and accidental actions to infants ranging from 14 to 18 months of age 
and measured whether they preferred to imitate those actions that were completed 
intentionally. Overall, they found that, regardless of age, infants reproduced significantly 
more intentional than accidental actions. However, the limited number of infants at either 
end of their age range might have prevented them from detecting a developmental 
progression in infants' conception of intention. In order to more systematically 
investigate this issue, Olineck and Poulin-Dubois (2005) recently replicated and extended 
these findings by testing separate groups of 14- and 18-month-old infants. Importantly, 
the results revealed a developmental progression in infants' ability to differentiate 
intentional from accidental actions between 14 and 18 months of age. Taken together, 
these empirical studies suggest that infants understand intentional actions early on. 
Additional evidence for an implicit understanding of intention and other mental 
states has been documented in children's early use of internal state terms during their 
everyday conversations (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Shatz 
et al., 1983). For instance, in a longitudinal study of 10 children who were followed from 
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1 to 6 years of age, Bartsch and Wellman (1995) found that children's conversations 
about the mind begin early with talk about desires and intentions (e.g., want, wish). 
Recently, an active line of research in ToM development has been focusing on the role 
that language might play in bringing the child from an implicit to an explicit 
understanding of the mind. Although there is no consensus about what aspect of language 
is involved in ToM development, it is well established that linguistic ability predicts 
performance on tests of theory of mind (Astington & Baird, 2005). For instance, it has 
been shown that individuals suffering from language deficits also tend to display delayed 
ToM development (Baron-Cohen, Baldwin, & Crowson, 1997; Bloom, 2000; Garfield, 
Peterson, & Perry, 2001; Tager-Flusberg, 1992). In addition, longitudinal research on 
language and ToM indicates that individual differences in language competence explain 
later individual variability in ToM skill between the ages of 2 and 3 years (e.g., Astington 
& Jenkins, 1999; Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dunn, 1996; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 
2002; Watson, Painter, & Bornstein, 2002). Taken together, these and other 
investigations provide empirical evidence to suggest that language is an important 
antecedent to ToM development. 
What remains to be investigated is whether there is continuity between children's 
implicit ToM in infancy, their use of internal state terms, and their explicit concept of 
people as mentalists in the preschool period. Many theoretical accounts propose that 
infants' social-cognitive abilities are related to later ToM ability. For example, it has been 
suggested that the emergence of joint attention skills in the second year of life is evidence 
for infants' understanding of intentional behavior (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Camaioni, 1992, 
1997; Tomasello, 1995). Other researchers have proposed that imitation, which reflects 
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the understanding of a match between oneself and the other, is the bedrock of ToM 
development (Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993; Rogers & Pennington, 1991). Finally, pretend 
play has been proposed as an early manifestation of children's capacity for meta-
representation (Leslie, 1987, 1994). 
Despite much theorizing about the continuity of ToM in infancy and the preschool 
years, there is surprisingly little direct empirical evidence to support the theoretical 
positions just reviewed. In fact, only a handful of longitudinal studies have investigated 
the hypothesis of a developmental continuity in ToM development from infancy to 
childhood. In one of the first studies, Youngblade and Dunn (1995) investigated whether 
there were links between infants' pretend play with peers at 33 months of age and their 
ability to understand other people's feelings and pass standard false-belief tasks at 40 
months of age. Importantly, they found that children who engaged in more pretend play 
when they were 33 months old were better at identifying feelings and recognizing false-
beliefs 7 months later. Another longitudinal study examining the continuity of ToM skills 
was conducted by Charman, Baron-Cohen, Swettenham, Baird, Cox, and Drew (2000). 
These researchers initially measured 20-month-old play, joint attention, and imitation 
skills. Then, when these children were 44 months of age, they completed a battery of 
ToM tasks, including a standard false-belief measure. Interestingly, joint attention 
behaviors, but not imitation or play, were associated with ToM ability at 44 months. 
More recently, Wellman, Phillips, Dunphy-Lelii and Lalonde (2004) found that there was 
continuity between infants' understanding of goal-directed actions at 14 months, as 
measured with an infant-controlled habituation procedure, and their general concept of 
the mind at 4 years of age. Most recently, Olineck and Poulin-Dubois (2005) conducted 
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the first longitudinal study to examine the link between infants' ability to distinguish 
intentional and accidental actions and their later production of internal state language. 
Fourteen- and 18-month-olds were administered an imitation task (adapted from 
Carpenter, Akhtar et al., 1998) in which an experimenter modeled accidental and 
intentional actions using toy devices. Then, when these children reached 32 months, their 
parents completed a 78-item questionnaire on their children's internal state language 
production, which was based on Bretherton and Beeghly (1982). The main findings 
revealed that infants who were more likely to only imitate an intentional action had a 
larger internal state lexicon at 32 months. Taken together, these results and those of the 
other few studies conducted recently are consistent with the hypothesis of continuity 
between early social-cognitive skills and later ToM. However, the specificity of the link 
between implicit and explicit ToM skills, as well as the factors that can account for this 
important developmental transition, remain to be examined. 
The goal of the present study was to systematically investigate the relationship 
between children's understanding of intention-in-action and general language skills in 
infancy, internal state language in toddlerhood, and ToM in the preschool period. 
Another objective of the present study was to examine children's concept of intention 
from infancy through the preschool years. Intention understanding is particularly central 
to social competence because understanding others' intentions is necessary in many 
interactive contexts (Tomasello et al., 2005). We also investigated to what extent general 
verbal skills and mental state vocabulary in infancy can predict general ToM 
development years later. In the present experiment, children who originally participated 
in an imitation task when they were 14 or 18 months old and whose parents provided 
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information regarding their internal state language at 32 months were invited to return to 
the laboratory when they were approximately 50 months of age. During this second 
laboratory visit, participants completed three tasks: 1) a target-hitting game adapted from 
Phillips, Baron-Cohen, and Rutter (Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 1998) which was 
designed to measure preschool children's ability to answer questions about their own 
intentions, 2) a standard "unexpected contents" false-belief task or the Theory of Mind 
Scale (Wellman & Liu, 2004), and 3) the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT: Dunn 
& Dunn, 1997) which measures receptive vocabulary by asking children to point to a 
picture that corresponds with a word. We expected that there would be a significant 
relationship between children's implicit concept of intention measured during infancy 
and their more explicit understanding of intention during the preschool years. In addition, 
we hypothesized that children's performance on the action imitation task at 14-18 months 
would be related to their later concept of the mind, as measured by the false-belief task 
and the Theory of Mind Scale. Finally, we predicted that there would be continuity 
between children's general language skills between 14 and 18 months, their use of 
internal state at 32 months of age, and their performance on preschool ToM tasks at 50 
months of age. 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-six 14-month-olds and 30 18-month-olds participated in an action 
imitation task and their parents completed the MacArthur Short Form Vocabulary 
Checklist: Level II Form A (MCDI: Fenson et al., 2000). Approximately three years later, 
15 of the children initially tested at 14 months and 16 of the children initially tested at 18 
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months returned to the laboratory to participate in the present follow-up experiment (20 
females and 11 males; M=50.05 months, SD=4.37, range=45.26-55.43 months). A 
sample recruitment letter and consent form is included in Appendix G and H, 
respectively. Parents of 26 of these children also completed a questionnaire regarding 
their internal state language production (see Appendix I) at 32 months of age (M=31.99, 
SD=0A3, range=31.03-33.13 months). 
Materials 
Imitation task. A rectangular wooden box (38 cm long, 25 cm wide, 9 cm tall) 
with six removable lids was constructed. Embedded in the center of each of the box lids 
were toy devices that could be easily manipulated by the infant (e.g., handle that twists). 
Two of the box lids were always used in the warm-up phase of testing and the remaining 
four lids were randomly assigned to four experimental trials. One of the lids used in the 
warm-up phase of testing included one toy device and the remaining five box lids 
included two toy devices that were matched for size and level of attractiveness. The base 
of the box was visibly connected to a computer monitor via a telephone cord. Following 
the action demonstration, computer animations were surreptitiously activated by the 
experimenter and were displayed on the monitor. 
Target-hitting game. A wooden structure (approximately 10 cm wide and 40 cm 
high), which shelved 6 different colored plastic canisters, was constructed. These plastic 
containers (7 cm wide and 7 cm tall) served as the targets for the game. They were easy 
to open and had the capacity to hold small prizes (e.g., ball, stickers). Half of the 
canisters contained a prize and half of them were empty. The plastic canisters were 
placed on a platform that consisted of six holes large enough to allow them to drop 
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through when activated. The cans rested on small metal rods that were retracted 
electronically with a universal remote control (i.e., magic wand). Children were told that 
the objective of the game was to hit the cans off the wall by aiming the "magic wand" at 
a predetermined target. Indeed, the manipulation of the remote appeared to cause the can 
that was hit to fall from the wall directly. However, a hidden experimenter specified 
which canister fell off the shelf using a hand-held toggle switch with six positions 
corresponding to the six locations on the shelf. Therefore, the participant was in control 
of when the canister fell, but the hidden experimenter determined which canister fell. A 
flipbook representing the target color for each trial served as a visual reminder of the 
canister the child was intending to hit for each trial. 
False-belief task. The props used in this task included a female puppet, an empty 
Smarties box, and 4 crayons. 
Theory of Mind Scale. Brief vignettes adapted from Wellman and Liu (2004) were 
used, as well as toy figurines, puppets, pictures, and a Smarties box containing crayons. 
Children's responses during this and the above tasks were videotaped for coding 
purposes. 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn & Dunn, 1997). In order to administer 
this standardized language measure, the following were used: the test manual, the test 
book containing a series of pictures, and the standard response forms. 
Procedure and Design 
Imitation task. The procedure was adapted from Carpenter and her colleagues 
(1998) and is described in detail in Olineck and Poulin-Dubois (2005). After two warm-
up trials designed to familiarize infants with the imitation task, infants were shown 
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demonstrations in which the investigator modeled a sequence of two actions, using the 
toy devices. One of the actions was portrayed as accidental and the other as intentional. 
The accidental action consisted of the investigator looking away from the box lid, while 
completing the action, and then putting a hand to her mouth and saying "Whoops!" with 
suitable intonation. Additionally, during the "accident" the investigator's face registered 
surprise and her upper body jumped up slightly. The intentional action consisted of the 
investigator looking attentively at one of the specific devices, completing the action 
slowly, and then smiling and saying "There" with appropriate intonation. During the 
completion of the intentional action, the investigator also leaned slightly toward the 
devices. The action sequence demonstrated by the investigator always resulted in 
activating a computer animation display. Then, the infants were given the opportunity to 
activate the computer animation. It was activated approximately two seconds after infants 
reproduced the intentional action. This delay provided infants with the opportunity to also 
reproduce the accidental action. The computer animation was not activated in cases 
where infants only reproduced the accidental action. If infants failed to activate the end 
result, the investigator proceeded to the next experimental trial. During the test phase, the 
order of the action sequence (i.e., accidental-intentional or intentional-accidental) 
alternated across the four trials. In addition, the side of the intentional action was 
counterbalanced, as well as the order in which the four experimental box lids were 
presented. 
Target-hitting game. The procedure for this task was modeled after Phillips et al. 
(1998). Children were told that the objective of the game was to use a magic wand to hit 
the canisters on the wall and win some prizes. They were informed that some of the cans 
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contained a prize and some of them were empty. Following a brief demonstration by the 
experimenter, a warm-up phase consisting of two trials was administered. In both warm-
up trials, the child always hit the target can; however, they only won one prize. During 
the test phase, the same procedure was employed. After the child hit a can and removed 
the lid to see if they won a prize, the experimenter responded with either "Oh look, you 
won a prize!" or "Oh look, no prize this time". The child was asked to hold the open 
canister (which either contained or did not contain a prize depending on the trial) in their 
hands while the experimenter said, "Listen carefully. Which can did you try to hit? The 
[insert color] or the [insert color]?" For half the trials, the color that was mentioned first 
was the target and the color mentioned second was one of the cans directly beside the 
target. For the remaining trials, the target color was mentioned second. 
The task consisted of a combination of hit (H), miss (M), prize (P), and no prize 
(NP) outcomes. A hit was achieved when the target can fell off the wall and a miss 
occurred when the can beside the target fell down instead. Regardless of whether the trial 
was set up to be a hit or a miss, a can always fell off the wall. In order to isolate intention 
understanding from the desire to win a prize, there were two discrepant conditions in 
which the child either missed the target but won a prize (MP) or hit the intended can but 
did not win a prize (FTNP). There were also two consistent conditions which could be 
answered based on desire and/or intention understanding: trials in which a prize was 
awarded when the target was hit (HP) or not awarded when a miss occurred (MNP). A 
total of 16 trials were administered, with 4 trials per condition. The condition (i.e., hit and 
miss) and outcome (i.e., prize and no prize) of the trials were counterbalanced. In 
addition, the order was arranged in a quasi-random fashion so that no outcome (i.e., prize 
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vs. no prize), condition (i.e., hit vs. miss), or target color appeared more than twice in a 
row. Children's responses to the test question were recorded and the number of times 
they correctly identified the intended target was coded (maximum=16; see Appendix J for 
a sample coding document). 
False-belief task. Children were shown a Smarties box and asked what they 
thought the box contained. If they did not spontaneously respond "candies" or 
"chocolates", the experimenter prompted them by pointing to the pictures on the box. 
After they responded correctly, the experimenter opened the box and revealed that there 
were really crayons inside. Then the experimenter put the crayons back inside the box, 
and asked the child what was really inside the Smarties box. Next, the experimenter 
introduced a puppet and asked children what Dora thought was in the box and whether 
she saw inside the box. Children were coded as having passed the false-belief task if they 
told the experimenter that Dora thought there were Smarties in the box and that she had 
not seen inside the box. 
Theory of Mind Scale. Children were presented with five interactive stories (see 
Wellman & Liu, 2004 for detailed descriptions), using toy figurines, pictures, and/or 
puppets, and were then asked questions regarding their own mental states and those of the 
story characters (see Appendix K). The stories tapped into children's knowledge of other 
people's desires, beliefs, knowledge access, false-beliefs, and the contrast between real 
and apparent emotions. The experimenter coded whether children responded correctly to 
the questions measuring their understanding of the five mental states, and assigned 
children a total score (maximum =5) on the Theory of Mind Scale (see Appendix L). The 
criteria provided by Wellman and Liu (2004) were utilized when evaluating children's 
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responses to the test questions. In addition to their overall score on the scale, children's 
performance on the false-belief task (i.e., pass or fail) was coded separately. Wellman 
and Liu (2004) consistently presented the story about diverse desires in the first or second 
position and the story regarding real and apparent emotions in the fourth or fifth 
positions. In the present experiment, the diverse desires task was always presented first 
and the real-apparent emotion task was always presented last. The remaining stories were 
presented in counterbalanced order, which results in a total of six orders for the tasks 
comprising the Theory of Mind Scale. 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT; Dunn & Dunn, 1997). The standardized 
protocol was used. Children's responses were recorded during the administration of the 
test, and they were assigned a standard score. 
The children initially tested at 14 months completed the target-shooting game, the 
PPVT, and the false-belief task. When the 18-month-olds returned to the lab, we had 
access to the Theory of Mind Scale (Wellman & Liu, 2004) and therefore these children 
completed this measure, which includes the false belief task. All children completed the 
target-shooting game first; however the order of the PPVT and the false-belief 
task/Theory of Mind Scale were counterbalanced across participants. 
Reliability 
Each participant was videotaped while they completed the target-shooting game 
and the false-belief task or the Theory of Mind Scale. All tapes were coded by the 
primary investigator. In order to establish inter-rater reliability, 20% of the data («= 6) 




The first question of interest was whether there was continuity between children's 
performance on the action imitation task at 14-18 months and their performance on the 
target-shooting game at 50 months. To represent children's performance on the imitation 
task in infancy, we utilized two dependent variables: 1) the difference between the 
percentage of time children reproduced the intentional action (out of 4) and the 
percentage of time they imitated the accidental action (out of 4) (i.e., Difference Score = 
% intentional actions imitated - % of accidental actions completed) (M=25.81, £.0=21.87, 
range=0-50), 2) the percentage of time they imitated the intentional action first (M=55.65, 
£0=25.58, range=0-100). The performance of the children included in the present 
longitudinal sample (N =31) was comparable to that of those who did not participate (N = 
25) for each of these two variables. To represent children's performance on the target-
shooting game, two dependent variables were also used. We computed children's scores 
in each of the discrepant conditions: 1) when children hit the target but did not win a 
prize (HNP: M=3.68, £0=.87, range=0-4), and 2) when children missed the target but 
won a prize (MP: M=1.35, £0=1.52, range=0-4). We analyzed children's performance in 
these two specific conditions because their intention (i.e., to hit a predetermined target) 
was distinct from their desire (i.e., to win a prize). In the original study by Phillips et al. 
(1998), children's performance on trials where the mental state of intention was isolated 
revealed a developmental shift in their concept of intention between 4 and 5 years of age. 
To examine whether there was a link between children's performance on intention tasks 
in infancy and the preschool years, we computed Pearson correlations between all of 
these dependent variables. We found a significant positive correlation between the 
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percentage of time children imitated the intentional action first and their score in the HNP 
condition of the preschool task, r=0.50,p<.0l. No other correlations reached statistical 
significance. 
Our second question of interest was whether there was continuity between 
children's performance on the action imitation task at 14-18 months and their more 
general concept of the mind during preschool years, as measured by their performance on 
either the standard false-belief task or the Theory of Mind Scale. All of the children who 
participated in the present study completed the false belief task. Ten of the children 
passed this task and 21 of them failed. Point Biserial correlations were computed with the 
two dependent variables reflecting children's performance on the action imitation task in 
infancy. No statistically significant relationships were found. As outlined earlier, the 
children initially tested at 18 months (n=16) completed the Theory of Mind Scale. It was 
noted that their total scores on the Theory of Mind Scale (M=2.88, £D=1.36, range=0-5) 
were comparable to those obtained by children ranging from 50-53 months of age in 
another recent study (Af=2.9, range=0-5) (Wellman & Liu, 2004). Because children's 
performance on the false-belief task was coded separately, the dependent variable used 
for the present study was children's score on the other 4 tasks comprising the Theory of 
Mind Scale (M=2.56, £0=1.09, range=0-4). Pearson correlations were computed between 
this score and the dependent variables characterizing the imitation task. No significant 
relationships were found. 
Next, we examined whether children's performance across the three preschool 
tasks was related. First, Pearson correlations were computed between children's score on 
the PPVT (Af=100.03, £D=13.95, range=56-129) and the two dependent variables 
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reflecting their performance on the target-hitting game. No significant correlations were 
found. Second, we ran a Point Biserial correlation between children's performance on the 
false-belief task and their scores on the PPVT. Not surprisingly, we found that children 
with better general language skills were also more likely to pass the false-belief task (r 
pbi=0.48,/?<.05.). We also ran a Pearson correlation between children's PPVT and their 
score on the Theory of Mind Scale and found no significant relation. Furthermore, to 
examine the coherence between preschoolers' concept of intention and their knowledge 
of other mental states, we computed Point Biserial correlations between children's 
performance on the false-belief task and their scores on the two dependent variables 
reflecting their performance on the target-hitting game. No significant correlations were 
found. We also ran Pearson correlations between their scores on the Theory of Mind 
Scale (excluding the false-belief task) and their scores on the two dependent variables 
characterizing the target-hitting game (n=16). Again, no significant correlations were 
found. Finally, we ran a Point Biserial correlation between children's performance on the 
false-belief task and the other four tasks comprising the Theory of Mind Scale. As 
expected, we found that children who passed the false-belief task also performed better 
on the Theory of Mind Scale, (r
 pbi=0.65,p<.05). 
In the next series of analyses, we examined whether there was continuity between 
children's general language skills between 14 and 18 months and their performance on 
ToM tasks at 4 years of age. First, we ran Pearson correlations between children's total 
score on the MCDI at 14-18 months and the dependent variables characterizing their 
performance on the target-hitting game at 50 months. No statistically significant 
correlations emerged. Next, we computed a Point Biserial correlation between children's 
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total scores on the MCDI at 14-18 months and their performance on the standard false-
belief task at 50 months. Interestingly, we found that children who scored higher on the 
MCDI in infancy were also more likely to pass the false-belief task at 50 months (rpbi 
=A5,p<.05). We also correlated children's total scores on the MCDI at 14-18 months 
and their performance on the Theory of mind Scale, excluding the false-belief task. This 
relationship was not significant. 
Our final question of interest was whether there is continuity between children's 
use of internal state terms at 32 months and their performance on ToM tasks at 50 
months. As described earlier, parents of 26 of the children who participated in this 
follow-up investigation also provided data regarding their child's internal state language 
at 32 months of age. For this sub-set of children, there continued to be sufficient 
variability in their internal state language production (M=47.35, SD= 18.34, range=10-
72). We computed Pearson correlations between children's internal state language and 
their performance on the target-hitting game according to the two dependent variables 
outlined previously. No statistically significant correlations emerged. Next, we computed 
a Point Biserial correlation between their performance on the false-belief task and their 
previous internal state language production. The results indicated that children who 
passed the false-belief task at approximately 50 months also produced more internal state 
terms at 32 months of age (rpbi =A3,p<.05). Finally, we computed a Pearson correlation 
between children's score on the other four tasks comprising the Theory of Mind Scale, 
and their previous internal state language production. Once again, we found a predictive 
relationship (r =.55,p<.05). In order to account for the effect of language, a partial 
correlation controlling for children's score on the PPVT, was computed. This correlation 
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was marginally significant, indicating that children's use of internal state language at 32 
months predicts their performance on the Theory of Mind Scale, even when general 
language abilities are accounted for ( r=.5\,p-.07). All correlations computed between 
children's performance on the infant imitation task, internal state language, and preschool 
theory of mind tasks are represented in Table 2. 
To summarize, the present study revealed a significant positive relationship 
between children's ability to differentiate between intentional and accidental actions in 
infancy and their later, more advanced, concept of intention in the preschool years. 
Specifically, we found that children who were more likely to reproduce the intentional 
action before the accidental action during the infant imitation task were also more likely 
to perform better on the target-hitting game. To our knowledge, this is the first study to 
provide preliminary evidence for a long-term association between children's implicit and 
explicit understanding of intention, from infancy to the preschool years. As expected, we 
also found a significant predictive relationship between infants' general vocabulary in the 
second year (i.e., MCDI scores) and their later performance on the false-belief task. 
Moreover, consistent with findings from other laboratories (e.g., Wellman et al., 2004), 
we found a significant link between children's scores on the PPVT and their performance 
on the false-belief task. An interesting finding from this research was that children's use 
of internal state language at 32 months predicted their performance on the false-belief 
task. Furthermore, children who produced more internal state terms at 32 months also 
scored higher on the other four tasks comprising the Theory of Mind Scale. Importantly, 
this predictive relationship was not uniquely language driven, as the correlation remained 
marginally significant when general language abilities were accounted for. These 
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Table 2 
Intercorrelations between children's performance on infant imitation task, internal state 
language, and their performance on preschool theory of mind tasks 
HNP MP FB ToM 
Scale 
(n=16) 
Infant task: Intentional action first .50** -.18 .05 -.02 
Infant task: Difference Score .19 -.01 -.10 -.07 
MCDI score (14-18 months) .02 -.16 .45* .42 
Internal state language at 32 months -.14 .06 .43* .55* 
(n=26) 
Target-hitting game: HNP score -.26 -.16 -.19 
(HNP) 
Target-hitting game: MP score -.04 .00 
(MP) 
False-Belief Task (FB) .65* 
**/?<.01,*/X.05 
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findings provide further evidence to suggest that there is a long-term association between 
children's early talk about the mind and their later ToM skills. 
Discussion 
Despite the fact that there is much speculation about the foundations of ToM in 
infancy, there has been little empirical evidence to support the claims that early social-
cognitive abilities are precursors to a ToM. Only a handful of studies have examined the 
developmental continuity in precursors of ToM concepts such as desire, intention, and 
attention. In a recent paper, Wellman et al. (2004) reported a correlation between 14-
month-old infants' attention decrement in a task measuring goal-directed action and their 
later ToM skills. However, these findings might simply reflect a general developmental 
status effect similar to the well-known relationship between attention decrement and later 
IQ (McCall & Carriger, 1993). The present study is the first to show that there may be 
relationships between children's early forms of intention understanding in infancy, their 
use of internal state language, and their more advanced understanding of the concept of 
intention at preschool age. 
More specifically, the results from the present experiment suggest that there is a 
link between children's ability to differentiate between intentional and accidental actions 
in infancy and their later, more advanced, concept of intention in the preschool years. In 
particular, we found that children who were more likely to reproduce the intentional 
action first during the imitation task also performed better on the preschool intention task. 
The other dependent variable reflecting infants' imitation of intentional actions did not 
correlate with preschool measures. This is likely due to the fact that this dependent 
measure had reduced variability. Interestingly, the outcome variable from the preschool 
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intention task that yielded positive findings is the critical condition, that is, the one that 
requires understanding of intention as distinct from desire. The present study provides 
preliminary evidence to suggest that there is developmental continuity between children's 
understanding of intention-in-action in infancy and their later, more advanced, 
understanding of intention in the mind. The fact that a long-term longitudinal association 
was observed between tasks that measure the same construct (i.e., intention) is an 
important finding. This data is consistent with a theoretical account that emphasizes 
infants' early sensitivity to the intentional structure of people's actions as playing a key 
role in children's developing understanding of people as mentalists. This finding seems to 
contrast with one previous longitudinal study that reported no association between 
imitation skills at 20 months and a battery of theory of mind abilities at 44 months 
(Charman et al., 2000). However, rather than testing general imitation skills per se, the 
task that we administered at 14 and 18 months tapped into infants' ability to differentiate 
intentional from accidental actions, using a range of behavior cues such as gaze, gestures, 
and vocalizations. As such, the present imitation tasks probably required good joint 
attention skills, which are themselves predictive of concurrent imitation of intentional 
actions and later theory of mind (Camaioni, Perucchini, Bellagamba, & Colonnesi, 1994; 
Charman et al., 2000). Thus, infants' ability to monitor and imitate the goals or intentions 
underlying other people's actions might be one of the critical steps towards developing a 
full-fledged concept of intention. Unexpectedly, we did not find that children's 
performance on the imitation task in infancy was related to their later understanding of 
false-belief or other mental states (e.g., desire, knowledge, emotion). As such, future 
research is warranted to examine whether a battery of infancy tasks tapping into a wide 
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range of mental states would predict performance on the Theory of Mind Scale at 
preschool age. To our knowledge, the present investigation included the largest sample of 
children ever tested in a longitudinal study examining ToM from infancy to the preschool 
years. Nevertheless, it is possible that more significant relationships between concepts in 
infancy and the preschool age may have been detected with a larger sample size. This 
limitation should also be addressed in future longitudinal investigations. 
Another important finding of the present study is that internal state language is 
highly predictive of later ToM. Specifically, we found that there was a significant 
relationship between children's use of internal state terms at 32 months and their general 
concept of the mind at 50 months, as measured by the false-belief task. There was also a 
significant positive correlation between children's internal state term production at 32 
months and their performance on the other four tasks comprising the Theory of Mind 
Scale, even when general language skills (i.e., PPVT) were partialled out. By 
demonstrating that children's internal state language is highly predictive of ToM skills 
approximately 2 years later, this study extends previous research that has shown a similar 
link during the preschool period (Brown et al., 1996; Ruffman et al., 2002). Moreover, 
the strong link that we observed between the number of internal terms produced by 
children at 32 months and their performance on ToM tasks at 4 V2 years supports the 
hypothesis that talking about mental states helps children learn about the mind (Hugues 
& Dunn, 1998; Ruffman et al., 2002). With respect to ToM and general language skills, 
the present study also went beyond previous research in uncovering a significant 
predictive link between general language and ToM over the largest developmental span 
ever studied, that is, between 14 and 54 months. We found a significant correlation 
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between children's scores on the PPVT and their performance on the false-belief task, 
which replicates previous research (Astington & Baird, 2005). In contrast, we did not find 
that children's scores on the PPVT were significantly related to their performance on the 
other four tasks that comprise the Theory of Mind Scale. These results replicate the 
findings reported by Wellman et al. (Wellman et al., 2004), who also demonstrated that 
the Theory of Mind Scale is a less language-laden measure of ToM. 
In conclusion, results from the present study are consistent with the hypothesis 
that there is continuity in social cognition between infancy and early childhood. This 
longitudinal study cannot answer questions about the mechanism by which precursors, 
such as the ones we have uncovered, affect later abilities. However, our demonstration of 
developmental continuities in the realm of social cognition provides critical information 
with regards to the controversy about the nature of early social-cognitive abilities (see 
Perner & Ruffman, 2005 for a lean interpretation of nonverbal tasks of mindreading 
skills). We believe that the results of the present investigation provide preliminary 
evidence to support the hypothesis that imitation of intentional actions and internal state 
language production tap into infants' early concept of the mind. Regardless of whether 
these precursors reflect infants' ability to acquire sophisticated behavioral rules or an 
implicit ToM, the present findings indicate that these abilities are somehow related to the 
acquisition of a full-fledged ToM. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
Summary of findings 
The purpose of the present dissertation was to investigate infants' understanding 
of intentional action. Two longitudinal studies were conducted in order to address two 
critical issues. First, are the experimental tasks that are currently being used to tap 
infants' understanding of intentional actions actually measuring the same underlying 
skills? Second, is there developmental continuity between children's early understanding 
of intentional action and their later, more advanced, theory of mind skills? 
The first paper (Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, submitted) examined whether infants' 
performances on different tasks commonly assumed to measure intention/goal 
understanding are related, as implied in the extant literature. Participants completed two 
visual attention tasks (i.e., the goal detection task and the action parsing task) at 10 
months and then returned to the laboratory to complete two imitation tasks (i.e., the 
selective action imitation task and the behavioral re-enactment task) when they were 
approximately 14 months of age. Interestingly, an association was observed between 
infants' decrement of attention scores on the two visual attention tasks administered at 10 
months. Unexpectedly, infants performances on the two imitation tasks administered at 
14 months were unrelated. An important finding of this study was that infants' looking 
behavior during the goal detection and action parsing tasks predicted their performance 
on only one of the imitation tasks administered approximately four months later. 
Specifically, infants' decrement of attention scores on the goal detection and action 
parsing tasks were correlated with their ability to infer the intended goal underlying a 
failed attempt at 14 months. Surprisingly, infants' performances on the two visual 
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attention tasks were not linked to their performance on the selective action imitation task. 
Given the lack of correlations between infants' performances on the selective action 
imitation task and the other three measures, the results of this study suggest that this 
imitation task may be tapping into different social cognitive abilities. Nevertheless, the 
findings provide preliminary evidence to suggest that the goal detection, action parsing, 
and behavioral re-enactment tasks are measuring related underlying skills. 
The second paper (Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2007) addressed whether there are 
developmental continuities between children's understanding of intentional action in 
infancy and their ToM skills during the preschool period. The relationships between 
children's early talk about the mind (i.e., internal state language) and later ToM abilities 
were also studied. Between the ages of 14 and 18 months, infants were administered a 
selective action imitation task. At 32 months, parents completed a questionnaire 
regarding their child's use of internal state terms. Finally, at approximately 50 months of 
age, children completed an intention task, a battery of ToM tasks, and a vocabulary 
measure. Interestingly, results indicated that children's early ability to differentiate 
intentional and accidental actions was correlated with their ability to distinguish intention 
from desires in the preschool period. However, children's performance on the selective 
action imitation task in infancy was not associated with their performance on more 
general measures of ToM later on. Another key finding in this paper was that children's 
talk about mental states (i.e., internal state vocabulary) predicted their performance on 
ToM tasks in the preschool period, even when receptive language skills were accounted 
for. Taken together, these results add to the body of evidence that supports the 
developmental continuity hypothesis and suggest that children's understanding of 
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intentional action and use of internal state language may be important precursors to later 
ToM. 
Overall, the findings from the two papers presented in this dissertation shed light 
on the development of children' understanding of intentional actions in two ways. First, 
by including a variety of experimental tasks designed to measure intention understanding, 
this series of papers provide empirical evidence to suggest that some of these tasks are 
indeed measuring related underlying skills. Surprisingly, results indicate that the selective 
action imitation task may be tapping into different social cognitive abilities. Second, by 
testing the same children from infancy to early childhood, results from this dissertation 
add to the body of evidence that suggests that there is developmental continuity in 
children's understanding of intention from infancy through the preschool years. 
Moreover, results indicate that children's early talk about the mind is highly predictive of 
later ToM abilities. Together, these studies also highlight the value of using longitudinal 
and within subjects designs to investigate precursors to theory of mind in infancy. 
Contributions to the literature 
Over the past two decades, cognitive developmental scientists have made exciting 
progress with respect to investigating the extent to which infants explain and predict 
human actions in terms of psychological states (Meltzoff, Gopnik, & Repacholi, 1999; 
Poulin-Dubois, 1999; Woodward, 2005). Infants seem to possess some rudimentary 
understanding of intentional action early on. As such, it has been proposed that 
understanding people as intentional agents may represent children's first step towards 
developing a full-fledged ToM (e.g., Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). Theoretically, 
it seems plausible that infants may possess an implicit understanding of intentions that 
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becomes more and more explicit as they age (Colonnesi et al., in press). However, until 
recently, there was little empirical evidence to substantiate this claim. Moreover, the 
studies that have investigated early precursors to ToM have been the subject of much 
debate. The crux of this debate centers on issues of interpretation. Preschoolers are 
required to explicitly demonstrate their mental state attributions by answering verbal 
questions about other's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors during experimental tasks (e.g., 
Wellman & Liu, 2004). Moreover, the false belief task has undergone thorough 
replication and is now sanctified as the litmus test for ToM. In contrast, infancy 
researchers (and primatologists) have had to devise innovative methods for testing 
preverbal children's understanding of people as intentional agents. The results gleaned 
from these tasks are inherently more ambiguous; therefore, there is significantly more 
room for interpretation. The current debate regarding 15-month-olds' ability to attribute 
false beliefs is an excellent illustration of the extent to which data interpretations may 
differ among researchers in the field (i.e., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005 versus ; Perner & 
Ruffman, 2005). 
As mentioned earlier, some researchers argue that infants' behavior during this 
type of task demonstrates their mentalistic understanding. Others argue that this 
interpretation is too "rich" and that infants' ability to predict how a person will act could 
be based simply on learned rules about behavior (Perner & Ruffman, 2005). Part of this 
contentious debate between "lean" versus "rich" interpreters in the field stems from the 
fact that these nonverbal infancy tasks have yet to be empirically validated. Construct 
validity refers to whether an empirical task taps the unobservable construct (i.e., concept 
of goal/intention) that it claims to measure. In order to achieve construct validity, 
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researchers must do the following: (1) generate a comprehensive definition of the 
construct, (2) translate this construct into specific experimental operations, and (3) obtain 
data to show that results from the measure being evaluated are positively correlated with 
other variables that are known to be related to the construct or that are theoretically 
linked (Christensen, 1997; Cook & Campbell, 1979). To date, infancy researchers seem 
to have a preliminary working definition of the concept of goals and/or intention. 
However, they have not yet provided sufficient evidence to suggest that an adequate 
translation of the conceptual variable (i.e., concept of intention) has been attained. 
One way for cognitive developmental scientists to establish the validity of a 
particular intention task is to determine the degree to which that operationalization relates 
to other intention tasks that are administered at the same time (Christensen, 1997). The 
first paper represents an important contribution to the field because it is the first study in 
the field of cognitive development to systematically investigate children's concurrent 
performance on different tasks designed to measure goal/intention understanding in 
infancy. The findings from this study suggest that goal detection, action parsing, and 
behavioral re-enactment tasks may be tapping into similar underlying skills. Interestingly, 
these three tasks tapping infants' understanding of intentional actions also all involve 
some sort of action violation. Surprisingly, results from this paper indicated that infants' 
looking behaviors during the two visual attention tasks were not associated with their 
performance on the selective action imitation task. Moreover, infants' concurrent 
performances on the behavioral re-enactment task and the selective action imitation task 
were unrelated. Some researchers have argued that infants' reproduction of failed 
attempts may be due to emulation learning, rather than an ability to infer underlying 
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intentions (Huang, Heyes, & Charman, 2002, 2006). In contrast, the selective action 
imitation task, which requires infants to distinguish intentional from accidental actions, 
may require a deeper understanding of intentionality. Interestingly, both the behavioral 
re-enactment and selective action imitation tasks have been found to predict 
preschoolers' concept of intention (Colonnesi et al., in press; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 
2007). Further replications are needed to determine the extent to which infants' 
performances on these tasks are related to their performance on other concurrent 
measures of intention understanding. Future studies should also address whether 
children's performance on the behavioral re-enactment task is linked with later use of 
internal state language, as has been shown for the selective imitation task (Olineck & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2005). 
Importantly, infants' performances on the two visual attention tasks measuring 
goal-detection and action parsing abilities were found to be related. More specifically, 
infants' attention to the events used for both tasks was positively correlated. It is possible 
that infants' attention scores during these tasks were coordinated simply because infants' 
processing speed is a stable trait, regardless of the nature of the stimuli (social or 
physical). However, it is also possible that infants who were more sensitive to the 
structure of intentional action were also more sensitive to the goals underlying human 
behavior, and were thus able to process this information at a faster rate. This significant 
correlation was impressive, given that infants were presented with live events during one 
task and video-clips during the other. Unfortunately, without the inclusion of a control 
task, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that the correlations found between 
infants' decrement of attention scores on the two visual attention tasks were not due to 
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other determinants of task performance (i.e., general intelligence, executive functioning 
skills, or information processing speed) in this study. However, it is our belief that the 
correlations found between infants' performances on these visual attention tasks provide 
preliminary evidence to suggest that these tasks are both measuring some understanding 
of intentional action. The fact that infants' decrement of attention scores on these tasks 
also predicted their subsequent performance on the behavioral re-enactment task also 
speaks to the validity of these measures. The present dissertation offers preliminary 
evidence to suggest that some of the tasks currently being used to measure intentional 
action understanding are indeed measuring related abilities. However, the results also 
raise important questions regarding the abilities that are being measured by the selective 
action imitation task. If, as the extant literature seems to assume, these tasks are all 
measuring some form of intention understanding, infants' performances should be linked. 
The present dissertation indicates that this is true for some tasks, but that this assumption 
should continue to be empirically tested with the inclusion of appropriate nonsocial 
control tasks. 
Another way to test the validity of the tasks being used to measure infants' 
understanding of intentional action is to conduct longitudinal research. If infant tasks are 
tapping into some form of intention understanding, then there should be long term 
associations between children's behavior on these infancy measures and their behavior 
during preschool tasks that assess ToM skills. To date, only a handful of such 
longitudinal research studies have been conducted. The majority of these investigations 
have documented social cognitive continuity for measures of attention during infant 
habituation tasks (e.g., Aschersleben et al., in press; Wellman et al., 2008; Wellman et al., 
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2004). A strength of the current dissertation is that other measures (i.e., imitation) were 
also used to capture infants' intention understanding. Results indicated that there is 
developmental continuity in children's understanding of intentional action from infancy 
to the preschool period. The short- and long-term associations that were found between 
tasks designed to measure the same construct (i.e., intention) in different age groups (i.e., 
infancy and preschool period) also speak to the validity of the visual attention and 
imitation tasks used in infancy. Interestingly, infants' performance on the selective action 
imitation task was linked with their performance on a preschool intention task but not 
with their performances on tasks measuring more general ToM skills (i.e., ToM Scale, 
False-belief task). In contrast, previous research using infant habituation tasks have found 
long-term associations between infants' understanding of intentional action and 
preschoolers general ToM abilities (e.g., Aschersleben et al., in press; Wellman et al. 
2004; Wellman et al., 2008). Once again, this finding suggests that the selective action 
imitation task may be tapping into different social cognitive abilities. However, it is our 
belief that these skills are still related to the acquisition of theory of mind, as infants' 
performance on this task has been found to be linked with their use of internal state 
language and their performance on a verbal intention task later on (Olineck & Poulin-
Dubois, 2005, 2007). 
Another significant contribution of the current dissertation is the finding that 
young children's internal state language was highly predictive of later ToM. Recall that 
we found that 32-month-olds' use of internal state terms predicted their performance on 
the false-belief task and other ToM tasks at 50 months, even when general language 
abilities were accounted for (Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2007) . As mentioned previously, 
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Olineck and Poulin-Dubois (2005) found that infants' performance on the selective 
action imitation task also predicted their use of internal mental state terms later on. 
Because infants' performances on the selective imitation task correlated with internal 
language, as one would predict based on theory, these results provide further evidence to 
support the validity of this measure of intention. Furthermore, the results described in 
Olineck and Poulin-Dubois (2005, 2007) add to the body of evidence that suggests that 
talking about mental states helps children learn about the mind (Hugues & Dunn, 1998; 
Ruffman et al., 2002). 
Taken together, results from the current dissertation offer important information 
and identify exciting new research questions for cognitive developmental scientists. 
Given the concurrent links that were found across infants' performances on different 
experimental tasks, results from the present series of studies provide preliminary 
evidence to support the validity of the nonverbal methods currently being used to 
measure precursors to theory of mind in infancy. Our demonstrations of developmental 
continuities in the realm of social cognition further support the validity of the nonverbal 
tasks used to measure intention understanding in infancy. In addition, the associations 
that were found between children's performance on intentional action understanding 
tasks in infancy and preschool theory of mind tasks provide preliminary evidence to 
support the developmental continuity hypothesis. 
The findings reported in the present dissertation are also relevant to existing 
theories regarding ToM development in childhood. Current theories on ToM stem from 
nativist or constructivist traditions. Nativist theories emphasize a child's innate 
understanding of the mind and the role of maturation (Meltzoff, 1999). For example, 
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Leslie, Freidman, and German (2004) have proposed that concepts of the mind are 
introduced into the child's cognitive system by an innate "theory of mind mechanism," a 
part of the core architecture of the brain that is specialized for learning about mental 
states. According to Leslie and his colleagues, children's acquire "mind reading" abilities 
because of the activation of a specialized neurocognitive mechanism. In contrast, 
constructivists propose that children develop their understanding of the mind by 
experimenting in the world around them (Meltzoff, 1999). Like scientists, children 
observe the behavior of other people, generate hypotheses about how mental states 
influence behavior, and revise their understanding based on the information or feedback 
they receive (Meltzoff, 1999). For example, Moore (2007) has suggested that children 
learn about the world by adopting other people's intentional relations to object and events 
during social interactions. According to Tomasello and his colleagues (Tomasello et al, 
2005), human beings are particularly skilled "mind readers" because of a strong desire to 
share emotions, experiences, and activities with other people. Moreover, these 
researchers suggest that understanding intentions is a foundational skill in ToM 
development because it provides a framework within which to interpret human behavior. 
Tomasello et al. (2005) proposed that infants progress through three levels of intention 
understanding. First, they are capable of detecting biological motion and are sensitive to 
self-propulsion. In the second phase, infants understand that people have goals and 
behave accordingly. Finally, infants come to understand that, in pursuing a goal, people 
generate specific plans of action and then choose which plan to enact based on their 
intentions and goals. Like traditional Piagetian theories of development, Tomasello and 
his colleagues (2005) posit that children's experiences foster their progress through these 
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phases. Based on the constructivist theoretical account, one would expect to observe a 
developmental progression in children's concept of intention from infancy through early 
childhood. The fact that children's early understanding of intentional action was found to 
be related to their use of internal state language and their more sophisticated concept of 
the mind in preschool lends support to the notion that children's experiences play a role 
in their development of theory of mind. 
Future Directions 
One limitation of the current dissertation is that the final samples in both studies 
are small. It is likely that more significant relationships between tasks and age groups 
would have been detected with larger sample sizes. Moreover, with a larger sample sizes, 
data could have been analyzed using regression analyses to determine causal links. 
Unfortunately, small sample size is a common drawback with longitudinal designs. 
Indeed, most of the longitudinal studies published on ToM have reported results from 
relatively small samples. For example, longitudinal associations have been uncovered in 
studies involving 13 children (Charman et al., 2000), 18 children (Wellman et al., 2004), 
and 20 children (Aschersleben et al., in press). Future research should aim to test larger 
numbers of children in infancy so that, even with attrition, investigators have enough 
statistical power to uncover potential links. However, it is important to highlight that, 
despite small sample sizes, the current dissertation uncovered important and meaningful 
links between infants' performance on various intention tasks. For instance, strong 
predictive relationships were observed between infants' abilities to detect an incomplete 
intentional action and parse actions along intentional boundaries at 10 months and their 
ability to infer the intended goal of a failed attempt at 14 months. In the second paper, 
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robust long-term associations were found between 14- to 18-month-old infants' ability to 
differentiate intentional and accidental actions and their ability to distinguish intention 
from desires at approximately 50 months of age. 
One might argue that the developmental continuity observed between infants' and 
preschoolers' concept of intention merely confirms that children who are cognitively 
advanced in infancy also tend to perform better on most cognitive tasks in preschool. 
Although we included a measure of language skills (i.e., PPVT) in the second paper, it 
would be beneficial for future research to include control tasks measuring general 
intelligence, executive functioning, and verbal competence. Interestingly, researchers 
have recently completed studies with these control measures and still found specific long-
term associations between infant social attention and preschool theory of mind (e.g., 
Wellman et al., 2008). It would also be interesting to explore whether training programs 
designed to foster ToM skills in infancy would have an impact on children's later ToM 
skills. 
Another important area for future research is to study whether similar 
developmental continuities emerge when other infant measures are used. For example, in 
the current dissertation, infants' performance on action parsing tasks predicted their 
ability to detect intentions underlying false attempts four months later. It would be 
interesting to determine whether children's sensitivity to the inherent structure of 
intentional action at 10 months would also be linked to their general theory of mind 
abilities (i.e., performance on the Theory of Mind Scale) later on. Ultimately, once a 
number of longitudinal studies have been conducted on the various infant measures, it 
will be very useful for the field to conduct a meta- analysis of these results. By 
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combining the results of several studies, a meta-analysis would help address the issue of 
limited statistical power (i.e., due to small sample sizes) and allow for more accurate data 
analyses. 
The results from the present dissertation also have important implications for 
researchers and practitioners in other fields such as clinical psychology (Flavell, 2004). It 
has been well-documented that children diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorders have 
difficulty understanding other people's knowledge and beliefs (Baron-Cohen, 2000). 
Moreover, theory of mind deficits have been used to explain autistic children's atypical 
social behavior (e.g., lack of social awareness, one-sidedness in interactions; (Happe, 
1994), communication development (e.g., delay or lack of speech development, 
stereotyped and repetitive use of language, abnormalities of prosody, repetitive use of 
language; (Tager-Flusberg, 1993), and absence of pretend play (Happe, 1994) . Once 
researchers have identified precursors of theory of mind in infancy, as well as empirically 
validated methods of measuring these abilities, they can collaborate with clinicians to 
design and test early screening tools for children at risk of developing autism spectrum 
disorders. The results of the present dissertation suggest that further research is needed to 
explore whether some of these intention tasks could eventually be used as early screening 
tools for autism. Future research should explore this possibility in more depth. 
In summary, longitudinal investigations represent an important new approach to 
studying theory of mind. It is logical to assume that children gradually converge on an 
adult-like theory of mind, with precursors to ToM in infancy (Flavell, 1999). However, 
more empirical evidence, derived from longitudinal studies, is necessary to verify this 
theoretical account. The findings from the present dissertation offer exciting new insights 
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to the field of cognitive development. These papers provide preliminary empirical 
evidence to suggest that visual attention and imitation tasks tap infants' early 
understanding of intentional actions. As such, these findings provide preliminary 
evidence to support the validity of these experimental measures. Furthermore, results 
from this dissertation are consistent with the hypothesis that there is continuity in social 
cognition between infancy and early childhood. Specifically, infants' ability to 
differentiate intentional from accidental actions is related to their ability to distinguish 
intention from desires in the preschool period. Furthermore, children's early use of 
internal state language is predictive of their ToM abilities later on. Overall, these findings 
provide valuable insight into the developmental progression of intention understanding 
from infancy to preschool and suggest that knowledge of intentional action represents an 
important step towards developing a theory of mind. 
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Appendix A 





The Child Development Laboratory at Concordia University is involved in a series of studies looking at 
how infants understand human actions and mental states. This research is funded by the Natural Sciences 
and Engineering Research Council of Canada. The Commission d'Acces a l'lnformation du Quebec has 
kindly given us permission to consult birthlists provided by the Regie Regionale de la Sante et des Services 
Sociaux de la Region de Montreal-Centre. Your name appears on the birth list of January 2005 which 
indicates that you have a child of an age appropriate for our study. 
The present study involves two tasks. In the first task, we are investigating infants understanding of 
purposeful actions. Specifically, we are interested in knowing if infants will notice when an agent's action 
is interrupted before having completed an obvious goal (e.g., a pause just before a hand takes away a toy). 
Infants will be shown movies depicting a person completing simple actions. Your child will be presented 
the films on a computer screen and the amount of time he or she looks at each film will be recorded. In the 
second task, we are studying whether infants understand the relation between a person and the object of her 
gaze. First, infants will be shown an actor turn and look repeatedly at one of two toys. Then, a curtain will 
be drawn and the location of the toys will be switched. Finally, infants will see two types of events: (1) the 
actor will turn to the same side but look at a new toy; (2) the actor will turn to the opposite side but look at 
the same toy. The amount of time that your child looks at each demonstration will be recorded. During 
these tasks, your child will be sitting in a child seat and you will be seated directly behind. The videotapes 
and all the data obtained from your child will be kept confidential. 
Participation involves one visit of approximately 45 minutes to our research centre on the Loyola Campus 
of Concordia University, located at 7141 Sherbrooke Street West. Appointments can be scheduled at a time 
convenient to you, including weekends. Free parking is available on the campus for our participants, and 
we will gladly reimburse any transportation expenses at the time of your appointment. Upon completion of 
the study, a Certificate of Merit will be given to your child, and a report of the results of the study will be 
mailed to you as soon as it is completed. 
For the purposes of this study, we are looking for infants who are 10 months of age, whose parents speak 
either English or French at home, and who do not have any visual or hearing difficulties. If you are 
interested in having your child participate in this study, or would like any further information, please 
contact Aguy Moryoussef or Kara Olineck at 848-2424, ext. 2279 or Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois at 848-2424, 
ext. 2219. We will try to contact you by telephone within a few days of your receipt of this letter. 
Thank you for your interest and collaboration. 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D. Kara Olineck, M.A. Aguy Moryoussef, B.A. 
Professor Ph.D. Candidate Research Assistant 
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology Department of Psychology 
(Francais au verso) 
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Parental Consent Form 
This is to state that I agree to allow my child to participate in a research project being 
conducted by Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois and Kara Olineck of Concordia University. 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to examine how infants 
understand human actions and mental states. 
B. PROCEDURES 
In this study, your child will complete two tasks. In the first task, we are investigating 
infants' understanding of purposeful actions. Specifically, we are interested in 
knowing if infants will notice when a person's action is interrupted before having 
completed an obvious goal (e.g., a pause just before a hand takes away a toy). Infants 
will be shown movies depicting a person completing simple actions. Your child will 
be presented the films on a computer screen and the amount of time he or she looks at 
each film will be recorded. In the second task, we are studying whether infants 
understand the relation between a person and the object of her gaze. First, infants will 
be shown an actor turn and look repeatedly at one of two toys. Then, a curtain will be 
drawn and the location of the toys will be switched. Finally, infants will see two types 
of events: (1) the actor will turn to the same side but look at a new toy; (2) the actor 
will turn to the opposite side but look at the same toy. The amount of time that your 
child looks at each demonstration will be recorded. During these tasks, your child will 
be sitting in a child seat and you will be seated directly behind. We will videotape 
your child's responses and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of confidentiality. 
That means that the researcher will not reveal your child's identity in any written or 
oral reports about this study. Your child will be assigned a coded number, and that 
number will be used on all data collected in this study. The entire session is expected 
to last approximately one hour. 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
Your child will be given a certificate of merit at the end of the session as a thank-you 
for his/her participation. 
There is one condition which may result in the researchers being required to break the 
confidentiality of your child's participation. There are no procedures in this 
investigation that inquire about child maltreatment directly. However, by the laws of 
Quebec and Canada, if the researchers discover information that indicates the 
possibility of child maltreatment, or that your child is at risk for imminent harm, they 
are required to disclose this information to the appropriate agencies. If this concern 
emerges, the lead researcher, Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois, will discuss the reasons for 
this concern with you and will advise you of what steps will have to be taken. 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
• I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my 
participation at any time without negative consequences, and that the experimenter 
106 
will gladly answer any questions that might arise during the course of the 
research. 
• I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e. the researchers 
will know, but will not disclose my identity). 
• I understand that the data from this study may be published, though no individual 
scores will be reported. 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS 
AGREEMENT. I FREELY CONSENT AND VOUNTARILY AGREE TO HAVE 
MY CHILD PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
MY CHILD'S NAME (please print). 





I would be interested in participating in the follow up study with my child at 14 
months? 
(yes/ no): 
I would be interested in participating in other studies with my child in the future? 
(yes/ no): 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you are 
free to contact Adela Reid, Research Ethics and Compliance Officer, Concordia 
University, at (514) 848-2424 ext 7481 or by email at areid@alcor.concordia.ca 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D. 
Professor 
Department of Psychology 
848-2424 ext.2219 
diane.poulindubois(a),concordia.ca 
Kara Olineck, M.A. 
Ph.D. Candidate 






Participant Information Form 
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Participant Information Form 
Please answer the following general information questions about your child. All 
your responses will be kept confidential. 
Child's Name: 
(first and last name) 
Date of Birth: 
(month/day/year) 
Gender: Language(s) spoken at home: 
Address: 
Postal Code: 
Telephone: (home) (work) 
(work) 
Mother's Name: Father's Name: 
Occupation: Occupation: 
Education: Education: 
(highest level attained) (highest level attained) 
Birth weight: 
Circle one: First Born, Second Born, Third Born, Other (please specify) 
Length of pregnancy: weeks 
Was your child born on time? Y/N If not, how early or late? 
Were there any complications during the pregnancy? 
Has your child had any major medical problems?. 
Does your child have any hearing or vision problems?. 
Does your child have any siblings? Yes / No 
If yes, how many? 
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Instructions for Parents 
1. When we enter the room where will be doing the study, please seat your child in the 
infant seat and sit behind your child in the chair provided. 
2. Before we begin the task, please ensure that your infant has no toys or food, as these 
items may be distracting. 
3. If possible, do not say anything and do not touch your child during the length of the 
experiment (about 20 minutes). Please do not point or call attention to any of the toys 
during the study. 
4. During the experiment, your child will probably turn around and look at you a few 
times. If this occurs, you may respond by smiling, but please try not to say anything. 
5. If your child becomes very fussy or starts to cry, we will pause the experiment to give 
you a chance to comfort him/her. 
I l l 
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Cod in" Cur Si'lircliM' U'lion Imitation I ask 
(llasi-d on ( :n peiitcr it al.. IWK; Olhuck & I'oiilin-Diihois. 2005) 
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Coding Form for Behavioral Re-enactment Task 
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( ndiii" l-'onn tor BHmviornl Uc-ciiui'tmcnt liisk 
(Biisyil on Mclt/olT. 1W5: KHhiffimlKt ft ;il. 2»()ft) 
Subject number: Order: Coded by: 
Date coded: 
Comments: 









Did llu- ml.ml 
pioducc ilie ond 














— — — 
TOTAL TARGET SCORE: (/5) 
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Coding I'onii lor lfch:i\ior:il Ue-i'iiacliiu-iil Lisk (coin.) 
(Bused on Mclf/olf. llW5; Kcllagamha vi :il. 200ft) 
Post-Test Coding (i.e., experimenter demonstrated target action and child was given 
the opportunity to imitate) 
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We would like to thank you for your past interest and participation in our research program and 
invite you to return to our laboratory for another study on cognitive development. As you may 
recall, your child participated in one of our research projects when they were approximately 18 
months old. In this study, we were interested in examining when young children are able to 
differentiate between intentional and accidental actions. We found that 14-month-olds have some 
understanding of other people's intentions; however, this understanding is less advanced than that 
of 18-month-olds. In addition, you may recall providing us with information regarding the types 
of words your child was able to produce when he or she was approximately 30 months of age. In 
this study, our aim was to determine whether there is a link between infants' understanding of 
people's mental states and the types of words they are able to produce later on. Interestingly, we 
found a significant relationship between infants' use of mental terms (e.g., want, hope) and their 
prior understanding of intention. These findings are very exciting, and have recently been 
accepted for publication in a scientific journal called Infancy. 
We are now eager to learn whether there is also a link between children's understanding of 
mental states in infancy and preschool. As such, we invite you to return to our laboratory with 
your child. Preschoolers will be asked to complete a number of fun interactive tasks, and will 
receive several toy prizes during the session. First, they will be given an opportunity to play a 
game in which they are required to make plastic cans fall in order to win prizes. Then, children 
will be presented with a series of stories and asked to guess what a puppet knows or prefers on 
the basis of these stories. We will also be investigating whether preschooler's vocabulary is 
related to their behavior during these tasks. To measure vocabulary, children will be asked to 
point to pictures that correspond to different words. Preschoolers' behavior during these tasks 
will be compared with the behaviors they exhibited during their first visit to our laboratory. 
Participation would involve one visit of approximately one hour to our research centre on the 
Loyola Campus of Concordia University, located at 7141 Sherbrooke Street West. Appointments 
can be scheduled at a time convenient to you, including weekends. Free parking is available on 
the campus for our participants, and we will gladly reimburse any transportation expenses at the 
time of your appointment. In addition, a report of these results will be mailed to you as soon as 
the study is completed. 
We would greatly appreciate your continued cooperation and interest in our research project. 
Research on children's early cognitive development is only possible thanks to the contribution of 
time and effort by families like you! If you would like further information about this study, have 
any questions about issues concerning cognitive development, or are willing to participate, please 
do not hesitate to contact Kara Olineck at 848-2424, ext. 2279 or Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois at 
848-2424, ext. 2219. 
We are looking forward to talking with you in the near future. 
Sincerely yours, 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D. Kara Olineck, M.A. 
Professor Ph.D. Candidate 
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology 
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Parental Consent Form 
The present investigation involves examining preschoolers' understanding of other 
people's mental states. Children will be asked to complete a number of fun interactive 
tasks, and will receive several toy prizes during the session. First, your child will 
participate in a game in which they will be required to hit a plastic can, with a remote 
control unit, in an attempt to win a prize. An experimenter hidden under a table will 
control which can will fall. Each child will participate in a total of 18 trials. 
Understanding of intention will be assessed by asking if they intended to hit the can that 
fell. Children will be allowed to keep all prizes that they win during the game. Then, your 
child will be presented with a series of stories, and asked to tell what a puppet knows or 
prefers on the basis of these stories. Your child will also be administered a standard 
vocabulary test, which involves pointing to pictures corresponding to different words. 
You will be able to watch your child from another room throughout the experimental 
session. Your child's responses will be written down and will be treated in the strictest of 
confidentiality. Because we are only interested in comparing childrens' understanding as 
a function of age, no individual scores will be provided following participation. The 
entire session is expected to last approximately 45 minutes. 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D. Kara Olineck, M.A. 
Professor Ph.D. Candidate 
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology 
The nature and purpose of this study have been satisfactorily explained to me and I agree 
to allow my child to participate. I understand that we are free to discontinue participation 
at any time without negative consequences and that the experimenter will gladly answer 
any questions that might arise during the course of the research. 
Parent's signature Date 
Participant # 
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Name of child 
Date of birth Date 
Mental Lexicon Questionnaire 
Cognitive Development Laboratory 
Centre for Research in Human Development 
Concordia University 
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A. VOCABULARY CHECKLIST 
Children understand many more words than they say. We are particularly interested in the words your child SAYS. Please 
go through the list and mark the words you have heard your child use. If your child uses a different pronunciation of a 
word, (for example, "raffe" instead of "'giraffe" or "skettr for "spaghetti"), mark the word anyway. Remember that this is 
a "catalogue" of all the words that are used by many different children. Don't worry if your child knows only a few of 
these right now. 

























Warm (same •: 








Sleepy (I am O 
sleepy) 
Sleepy (1 don't O 
want to sleep) 
Asleep O 
Awake O 






Feel (go )d, bad) 
To be all right 
Better 















































































Mean (i.e. I mean) 
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Coding Form for the Target-hitting Game 
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I) Naming Colors 
(Check if child named color correctly): 

































































Note: Correct response is indicated by asterisk 
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Protocol for Theory of Mind Scale 
Adapted Directly from Wellman & Liu, 2004 
1) Diverse Desires Task: 
Experimenter: "I have something to show you". 
The child is shown a toy figure of an adult and a sheet of paper with pictures of a carrot and a 
cookie on it. 
Experimenter: "Here's Mr. Jones. It's snack time so Mr. Jones wants a snack to eat. Here are 
two different snacks: a carrot and a cookie. Which snack would you like best? Would you like a 
carrot or a cookie best?" (Own desire question) 
If the child chooses the carrot... 
Experimenter: "Well, that's a good choice, but Mr. Jones really likes cookies. He 
doesn't like carrots. What he likes best are cookies". 
If the child chooses the cookie... 
Experimenter: "Well, that's a good choice, but Mr. Jones really likes carrots. He 
doesn't like cookies. What he likes best are carrots". 
Experimenter: "So, now it's time to eat. Mr. Jones can only choose one snack, just one. Which 
snack will Mr. Jones choose? A carrot or a cookie?" {Target question) 
Note: To be correct, or to pass this task, the child must answer the target question correctly 
(opposite from his or her answer to the own desire question) 
2) Diverse Beliefs Task: 
Experimenter: "I have something to show you". 
The child is shown a toy figure of a girl and a sheet of paper with pictures of bushes and a garage 
on it. 
Experimenter: "Here's Linda. Linda wants to find her cat. Her cat might be hiding in the 
bushes or it might be hiding in the garage. Where do you think the cat is? In the bushes or in the 
garage?" (Own belief question) 
If the child chooses the bushes... 
Experimenter: "Well, that's a good idea, but Linda thinks her cat is in the garage. She 
thinks her cat is in the garage". 
If the child chooses the garage... 
Experimenter: "Well, that's a good idea, but Linda thinks her cat is in the bushes. She 
thinks her cat is in the bushes". 
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Experimenter: "So, where will Linda look for her cat? In the bushes or in the garage?" 
{Target question) 
Note: To be correct, or to pass this task, the child must answer the target question correctly 
(opposite from his or her answer to the own belief question) 
3) Knowledge Access Task: 
Experimenter: "I have something to show you". 
The child is shown a plastic table with a drawer containing a small plastic toy cat inside the 
closed drawer. 
Experimenter: "Here's a drawer. What do you think is inside the drawer?" (Own belief 
question) 
The child can give any answer he/she likes or indicate that he/she does not know. 
Experimenter opens the drawer and the child is shown the contents of the drawer. 
Experimenter: "Let's see...it's really a cat inside!" 
Experimenter closes drawer. 
Experimenter: "Okay, what is in the drawer?" 
The child is shown a toy figure of a girl. 
Experimenter: "Polly has never ever seen inside this drawer. Now here comes Polly. So, does 
Polly know what is in the drawer?" (Target question) 
Experimenter: "Did Polly see inside this drawer?" (Memory question) 
Note: To be correct, or to pass this task, the child must answer "no" to the target question and "no 
to the memory control question. 
4) Contents False Belief Task: 
Experimenter: "I have something to show you. Look, look at this box". 
The child is shown a smarties box and asked what they think the box contains. 
Experimenter: "What do you think is inside this box?" 
If the child responds with candies or smarties, then proceed to the next step. If the child does not 
spontaneously respond in this way, the experimenter should prompt the child by pointing to the 
picture of smarties 
Experimenter: "Look at these! Do you know what these are?" 
When the child responds, the experimenter should repeat the previous question 
Experimenter: "What do you think is inside this box?" 
After the child responds correctly, the experimenter opens the box to reveal crayons inside. The 
experimenter acts surprised to learn that the child is wrong. 
Experimenter: "Let's open it up and see what is in here". 
Experimenter: "Look! There are really crayons inside the box!" 
Then, the experimenter puts the crayons back inside the box and closes it up again. 
Experimenter: "Okay, what is really in the smarties box?" 
The experimenter introduces a puppet. 
Experimenter: "Look! This is Dora, and he/she has never ever seen inside this smarties box" 
Experimenter: "What does Dora think is in the box? Smarties or crayons?" (target question) 
Experimenter: "Did Dora see inside this box?" (memory question) 
Note: To be correct, the child must accurately answer the target question (smarties) and the 
memory question (no). 
5) Real-Apparent Emotions Task: 
Experimenter: "I have something to show you". 
The child is shown a piece of paper with three faces drawn on it (a happy, a neutral, and a sad 
face) 
Experimenter: "Can you point to the face that is happy.. .okay.. .and sad" 
The experimenter corrects the child if necessary. 
Experimenter: "Good." 
Faces are put aside. 
Experimenter: "I'm going to tell you a story about a boy. I'm going to ask you about how the 
boy really feels inside and how he looks on his face. He might really feel one way inside but look 
a different way on his face. Or, he might really feel the same way inside as he looks on his face. 
I want you to tell me how he really feels inside and how he looks on his face." 
Child is shown a boy puppet from the back so that the boy's facial expression can not be seen. 
Experimenter: "This story is about Matt. Mart's friends were playing together and telling jokes. 
One of the older children, Rosie, told a mean joke about Matt and everyone laughed. Everyone 
thought it was very funny but not Matt. But, Matt didn't want the other children to see how he 
felt about the joke because they would call him a baby. So, Matt tried to hide how he felt." 
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Experimenter: "What did the other children do when Rosie told a mean joke about Matt?" {First 
Memory Check: laughed or thought it was funny) 
Experimenter: "In the story, what would the other children do if they knew how Matt felt?" 
{Second Memory Check: call Matt a baby or tease him) 
Experimenter: "So, how did Matt really feel, when everyone laughed? Did he feel happy, sad, or 
okay?" (Experimenter points to the three faces). (Target feel question) 
Experimenter: "How did Matt try to look on his face, when everyone laughed? Did he look 
happy, sad, or okay?" (Experimenter points to the three faces). (Target look question) 
Note: To be correct, or to pass this task, the child's answer to the target feel question must be 
more negative than his/her answer to the target look question (i.e., sad for target feel and happy or 
okay for target look, or okay for target feel and happy for target look). 
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Appendix L 
Coding Form for the Theory of Mind Scale 
(Chapter 3) 
132 
THEORY OF MIND SCALE - CODING SHEET 





Diverse Desires Task Circle Child's Response 
Which snack would you like best? (own desire) carrot cookie 
Which snack will Mr, Jones choose? (other's desire) carrot cookie 
To receive a score of 1, other's desire must be opposite own desire 
Diverse Beliefs Task Circle Child's Response 
Where do you think the cat is? (own belief) 





To receive a score of 1, other's belief must be opposite own belief 
Knowledge Access Task Circle Child's Response 
What do you think is inside the drawer? (own belief) 
Does Polly know what is in the drawer? (target question) Yes 
Did Polly see inside this drawer? (memory question) Yes 
No 
No 
To receive a score of 1, child must answer "no" to both target and memory questions 
Contents False Belief Task Circle Child's Response 
What do you think is inside the box? (own belief) 
What is really inside the Smarties box? (own knowledge) Smarties Crayons 
What does Dora think is in the box? (target question) Smarties Crayons 
Did Dora see inside this box? (memory question) Yes No 
To receive a score of 1, child must answer "smarties" for target question and "no" for 
memory question 
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Real-Apparent Emotion Task Circle Child's Response 
What did the other children do when Rosie told a mean 
joke about Matt? (memory check #1) 
What would the other children do if they knew how Matt 
felt? (memory check #2) 
How did Matt really feel when everyone laughed?(fargef 
feel question) 
How did Matt try to look on his face when everyone 





To receive a score of 1, child's answer for target feel question must be more negative than 
for the target look question 
Score 
Total TOM Scale Score 
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